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This paper surveys the literature on the macroeconomic effects of government
debt.  It begins by discussing the data on debt and deficits, including the
historical time series, measurement issues, and projections of future fiscal
policy.  The paper then presents the conventional theory of government debt,
which emphasizes aggregate demand in the short run and crowding out in the
long run.  It next examines the theoretical and empirical debate over the
theory of debt neutrality called Ricardian equivalence.  Finally, the paper
considers the various normative perspectives about how the government should
use its ability to borrow.
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Introduction
An important economic issue facing policymakers during the last two
decades of the twentieth century has been the effects of government debt.  The
reason is a simple one: The debt of the U.S. federal government rose from 26
percent of GDP in 1980 to 50 percent of GDP in 1997.  Many European countries
exhibited a similar pattern during this period.  In the past, such large
increases in government debt occurred only during wars or depressions. 
Recently, however, policymakers have had no ready excuse.
This episode raises a classic question: How does government debt affect
the economy?  That is the question that we take up in this paper.  It will not
surprise the reader to learn that macroeconomists are divided on the answer. 
Nonetheless, the debates over government debt are fascinating and useful to
study.  They are fascinating because they raise many fundamental questions
about economic behavior.  They are useful to study because learning the
sources of disagreement can help an impartial observer reach a judgment of his
own.
Our survey of the effects of government debt is organized as follows. 
Section I considers some of the data on government debt.  These data give some
sense of the history of government debt in the United State and elsewhere. 
This section also discusses some recent projections for the beginning of the
twenty-first century.
Section II then examines the conventional view of the effects of
government debt.  We call this view "conventional" because it is held by most
economists and almost all policymakers.  According to this view, the issuance
of government debt stimulates aggregate demand and economic growth in the
short run but crowds out capital and reduces national income in the long run.
Section III turns to an alternative view of government debt, called
Ricardian equivalence.  According to this view, the choice between debt and     1We take GNP data from Berry (1978, table 1B) for 1791 to 1868, from
Romer (1989) for 1869 to 1928, and from the National Income and Product
Accounts since 1929.  The end-of-year debt comes from Bureau of the Census
(1975, series Y493) for 1791 to 1939, from Congressional Budget Office (1993,
table A-2) for 1940 to 1961, and from CBO (1997a, table F-4) since 1962.  We
splice the series multiplicatively at the break points and convert debt from
fiscal-year to calendar-year form.
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tax finance of government expenditure is irrelevant.  This section discusses
the basis of this idea, its history and importance, and the debate over its
validity.
Section IV moves from positive to normative analysis.  It considers
various perspectives on the question of how the government should use its
ability to borrow.  The discussion highlights the potential significance of
countercyclical fiscal policy, optimal national saving, and intertemporal tax
smoothing.
  I. The Data
In this section we present some basic facts about government debt and
deficits in the United States and other countries.  We give the official data,
and then examine a number of issues regarding the appropriate measurement of
fiscal policy.  We conclude the section by considering projections of future
fiscal policy in a number of countries.
A. Debt and Deficits in the United States and Other Countries
We begin with data from the United States.  Panel A of Figure 1 shows
U.S. federal debt as a percentage of gross national product over the past 200
years.1  It is common to exclude the debt of state and local governments, as
we do, although for many purposes it is more appropriate to consider the
consolidated debt of all levels of government.  Most state governments hold
positive net assets, because they are prohibited from running deficits in
their operating budgets, and because the assets they accumulate to fund     2The budget surplus comes from Bureau of the Census (1975, series Y337)
for 1791 to 1928, from Bureau of the Census (1975, series Y341) for 1929 to
1961, and from CBO (1997a, table F-4) since 1962.  We convert these numbers
from a fiscal-year basis to a calendar-year basis.  Note that the deficit does
not equal the annual change in federal debt.  Roughly speaking, the change in
debt reflects the government's cash outlays and receipts, while the unified
deficit involves a limited amount of capital budgeting.  We return to this
issue below.
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employee pensions exceed the debt they issue to finance capital projects.  The
figure shows federal debt "held by the public," which includes debt held by
the Federal Reserve System but excludes debt held by other parts of the
federal government, such as the Social Security trust fund.
The primary cause of increases in the U.S. debt-output ratio has been
wars: The War of 1812, the Civil War, World War I, and World War II all
produced noticeable upswings in federal indebtedness.  The Great Depression
and the 1980s are only two peacetime intervals when this ratio increased
significantly.  Between these sharp increases, the debt-output ratio has
generally declined fairly steadily.  An important factor behind the dramatic
drop between 1945 and 1975 is that the growth rate of GNP exceeded the
interest rate on government debt for most of that period.  Under such
circumstances, the government can collect taxes equal to only its non-interest
spending, finance the interest payments on the outstanding debt by issuing
more debt, and still watch its debt grow more slowly than the economy.  This
situation has potentially important implications for the effect of government
debt, as we discuss later. 
Panel B of Figure 1 shows the U.S. federal budget deficit as a share of
GNP over the past 200 years.2  These deficit numbers are for the so-called
"unified budget," which includes both "on-budget" items like national defense
and "off-budget" items like Social Security, thus capturing essentially all of
the fiscal activities of the federal government.  Once again, the effect of
wars is quite apparent.  The small deficits between 1955 and 1975 were
consistent with a declining debt-output ratio for the reason just mentioned:4
Although the debt was growing, output was growing faster.  After 1975, larger
deficits and a less favorable relationship between the interest rate and the
growth rate caused the debt-output ratio to rise.
Government debt and deficits in other industrialized countries span a
wide range, as shown in Table 1.  The first column presents general government
net financial liabilities as a percentage of GDP.  This measure differs in
several respects from that shown in panel A of Figure 1: It includes all
levels of government, nets out financial assets where the data are available,
and normalizes by GDP rather than GNP.  Nevertheless, the U.S. value for 1996
matches the last point shown the figure.  The second and third columns show
the budget surplus and primary budget surplus as percentages of GDP.  The
primary surplus equals taxes less all non-interest spending.  The highest
reported debt-income ratios are in Italy and Belgium; their high debt service
payments induce substantial budget deficits despite primary budget surpluses.
B. Measurement Issues
The official U.S. data on federal government debt and deficits obscure a
number of interesting and important issues in assessing fiscal policy.  We now
discuss some of these measurement issues.
1. Adjusting for Economic Conditions
Official data on debt and deficits are often adjusted to reflect three
economic variables: the price level, interest rates, and the business cycle. 
The adjustment for the price level occurs because the real value of the debt
is, for many purposes, more important than the nominal value.  For the level
of the debt, the price-level adjustment is obvious: If D is the debt and P is
the price level, then the real debt is D/P.  For the deficit, however, the
price-level adjustment is somewhat more subtle.  It is natural to define the5
real deficit to be the change in the real value of the debt.  In this case,
the real deficit equals the nominal deficit (deflated by the price level)
minus the inflation rate times the existing debt.  That is, 
d(D/P)/dt  = (dD/dt)/P - [(dP/dt)/P](D/P).
The inflation correction, which is represented by the second term on the
right-hand side of this equation, can be large when inflation is high or the
outstanding debt is large.  Indeed, it can turn a nominal budget deficit into
a real budget surplus.
The second adjustment is for the level of interest rates.  The
adjustment arises because the market value of the debt may be more important
than the par value.  When interest rates rise, outstanding debt falls in
value, and when interest rates fall, the opposite occurs; of course, a given
rate change will cause debt with a longer maturity to be revalued more than
shorter-term debt.  The market value of U.S. debt over time can be calculated
using the data and procedures outlined in Seater (1981), Butkiewicz (1983),
and Cox and Hirschhorn (1983).  The annual change in the market value can
differ noticeably from the annual change in the par value, but the series
follow the same broad trends.
The third common adjustment to the budget deficit is for business cycle
conditions.  Because the deficit rises automatically when economic activity
slows, and vice versa, the budget deficit in a given year may offer a
misleading impression of underlying fiscal policy.  The "standardized
employment deficit" (CBO, 1997a) eliminates the effects of the business cycle
on the budget.  This deficit is based on estimates of what spending and
revenue would be if the economy were operating at normal levels of
unemployment and capacity utilization.
2. Assets and Liabilities Beyond the Official Debt
Debt held by the public is the largest explicit liability of the federal6
government, but it is not the only liability.  Moreover, the federal
government also holds significant assets.  As emphasized by Eisner and Pieper
(1984) and Eisner (1986), all of these assets and liabilities should be
considered in any overall accounting of the government's financial situation. 
Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to assess the value of many government
assets and liabilities.
Some valuation problems are primarily technical.  For example, a large
share of the government's physical capital is defense-related, and many of
these goods are not sold in (legal) markets.  As another example, federal
insurance of bank deposits may prove to be either very costly to the
government or very inexpensive, and it is difficult to assess the
probabilities of the alternative outcomes.
Other valuation problems are more conceptual.  Do the future Social
Security benefits specified by current law constitute a government liability
in the same sense as explicit debt?  The answer to this question depends at
least partly on how the liability is perceived by households.  If households
believe that these benefits will be paid with the same probability that the
explicit debt will be honored, then it may be sensible to count the present
value of the benefits as government debt.  In this specific case, the
additional debt could be roughly three times the explicit debt, as Feldstein
(1996a) estimates the present value of Social Security benefits less taxes for
current adults at roughly $11 trillion in 1995.  Similar questions arise for
civil service and military retirement benefits, Medicare, and other
entitlement programs.  The important general point is that the appropriate
measure of government indebtedness largely depends on peoples' behavior.  As a
result, deciding what measure of fiscal policy is best requires taking a stand
on the correct model of economic behavior. 
Attempts to measure a range of explicit government assets and
liabilities include the presentations of historical federal balance sheets by7
Eisner (1986), Bohn (1992), and the Office of Management and Budget (1996). 
OMB's estimates for 1995 are summarized in Table 2.  The largest liabilities
are debt held by the public (excluding the Federal Reserve) and expected
pension liabilities for federal military and civilian employees.  OMB also
includes the expected cost of contingent liabilities that arise from loan
guarantees and insurance programs.  The federal government's financial assets
include gold and loans owed to the government; its physical assets include
both reproducible plant and equipment (about three-quarters of which relates
to national defense) and nonreproducible capital such as land and mineral
deposits.  OMB does not include in these estimates the cost of future Social
Security payments and other "continuing commitments," arguing that the
appropriate way "to examine the balance between future Government obligations
and resources is by projecting ... total receipts and outlays" (p. 20).
As it turns out, OMB estimates the government's assets to be worth
roughly as much as its non-debt liabilities in 1995, so net explicit
liabilities are close to the value of debt. Indeed, net liabilities appear to
have followed debt fairly closely in recent decades, despite sometimes
significant differences in their annual changes.  Debt increased by about $2.4
trillion between 1975 and 1995, while OMB estimates that liabilities rose
about $2.6 trillion.  Yet, these measures diverged sharply before 1975.  Bohn
estimates that the net worth of the federal government was roughly the same
share of GNP in 1975 as in 1947, as a dramatic decline in the debt share was




One way to incorporate some government assets into the regular budget
process is to create separate capital and operating budgets.  In this way,
current outlays would include not the acquisition of capital goods, but the     3Formally, the change in debt equals the deficit less so-called "other
means of financing."  Much of this category consists of short-term differences
between the deficit and borrowing needs, but some other means of financing
(such as direct student loans) involve quite long-term divergences.
     4This treatment in the National Income and Product Accounts was
introduced in 1996.  There are a number of other discrepancies between unified
budget principles and NIPA budget principles.  These include geographic
differences, timing conventions, and some shifting of items between the
revenue and expenditure sides of the budget.
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depreciation of previously purchased capital.  One effect of capital budgeting
is that it would allow the government to spend money on capital assets without
running an explicit deficit.  Some observers view this situation as an
inducement to profligate spending, particularly because it is difficult to
decide exactly what constitutes capital, and many types of spending could
acquire that label.  For whatever reason, the U.S. federal government (unlike
many state governments) does not rely on a capital budget as a central element
of its budget process.  Nevertheless, the principle of capital budgeting does
affect budget numbers in two ways.
First, the unified budget includes some specific kinds of capital
budgeting.  Since 1992, for example, government credit programs have been
counted not in terms of their current outlays, but in terms of the present
value of their expected future outlays.  Thus, the deficit cost of a direct
student loan is not the loan amount itself, but the net cost of providing the
loan, taking into account the probability of default.  Because the
government's cash outlays reflect the total amount of the loan, the increase
in the debt exceeds the deficit.  A similar pattern is repeated for some other
fiscal activities where the budget amounts differ from the contemporaneous
cash outlays or receipts.3
Second, the federal budget as recorded in the National Income and
Product Accounts does treat government consumption and investment in physical
capital differently.4  Government consumption includes an estimate of the
depreciation of government capital, and government purchases of new capital9
are tallied separately.  The federal government's investment in physical
capital is fairly modest, with gross investment less than fifteen percent of
consumption expenditures in 1994.
4. Generational Accounting
One prominent alternative to standard debt and deficit accounting is
"generational accounting," proposed by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991)
and Kotlikoff (1992).  These authors argue that the conventional deficit and
explicit debt "simply reflect economically arbitrary labeling of government
receipts and payments," so that the measured deficit "need bear no
relationship to the underlying intergenerational stance of fiscal policy" (p.
56).  Generational accounts measure fiscal policy by its impact on different
generations, not by the annual flows of spending and taxes.
Generational accounts are constructed by extrapolating current policies
through the lifetimes of all people currently alive, and calculating the net
taxes they would pay under those policies.  The net taxes of future
generations are then set at a level which satisfies the government's
intertemporal budget constraint.  These calculations provide important
information about how fiscal policy redistributes resources across
generations.  For example, most of the transfer from young to old during the
postwar period occurred not in the 1980s when measured deficits were high, but
between the 1950s and 1970s when deficits were low but Social Security
benefits were being enhanced.  
Nevertheless, generational accounts do suffer from some problems, as
explored by Cutler (1993) and Congressional Budget Office (1995).  One set of
problems involves technical issues in constructing the accounts.  For example,
it is unclear what is the appropriate discount rate for future taxes, and
different discount rates produce very different quantitative results.  A10
second issue is whether the labelling of government receipts and payments
truly is arbitrary.   For instance, the methodology of generational accounting
treats Social Security payments and interest payments on government debt as
essentially equivalent.  Yet it is surely easier for the government to reduce
future Social Security benefits than to reduce future coupon payments on
existing debt securities.  The label "government debt" appears to have some
true meaning.
A final important problem springs from the fact that generational
accounting is inextricably tied to a specific model of individual behavior. 
In particular, the methodology assumes that people are life-cycle consumers
without a bequest motive, so that their behavior and well-being depend on
their assessment of government policies over their entire lifetimes and only
over their lifetimes.  If individuals are liquidity-constrained or myopic,
however, then their behavior and well-being may be more sensitive to current
taxes than to the present value of the future taxes they expect to pay. 
Conversely, if individuals have altruistic bequest motives (a possibility we
discuss extensively later), then their behavior and well-being will be
sensitive to future taxes that will be paid by their descendants.  In either
case, generational accounts fail to provide a good gauge of fiscal policy for
either positive or normative purposes.
C. Future Fiscal Policy
Current patterns of taxes and spending are unsustainable in most
industrialized countries over the next twenty-five years.  The primary causes
of this situation are the aging of their populations and the rising relative
cost of medical care.  Table 3 presents the elderly dependency ratio--defined
as the population age 65 and over as a percentage of the population ages 20 to
64--for a number of countries.  Between 1990 and 2030, longer lifespans and
continued low birthrates will sharply increase the ratio of retirees to11
working adults.  The U.S. population is projected to age less dramatically
than the population of many other industrialized countries, but the increase
in retirees per worker in the United States is still expected to exceed 50
percent.
In most countries, health care has absorbed an increasing share of
national income over the past several decades.  The cost of producing most
specific medical services may not have increased, but the cost of providing
medical care that meets the social standard clearly has risen.  Predicting
future developments in this area is difficult, but most analysts expect the
relative cost of medical care to continue to increase for some time.
A large share of government outlays involves transfers from working
adults to retirees or the financing of health care. (Of course, these
categories overlap heavily.)  Thus, the aging of the population and the
increasing cost of health care will put a significant strain on government
finances over the coming decades.  Table 4 shows projections for the effect of
population aging on various countries' budget surpluses and debts under the
assumption that current tax and spending rules remain unchanged.  The numbers
show only the direct effect of aging, and ignore the problem of paying
interest on the accumulating debt.  The projections are highly uncertain as
well.  Nevertheless, they show a marked deterioration in the fiscal situation
of almost every country.
For the United States, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 1997b) has
performed a careful analysis of the fiscal outlook.  The analysis incorporates
the need to pay interest on the accumulating debt, as well as the feedback
between debt and the economy.  Table 5 summarizes CBO's results.  Without
economic feedbacks, government debt more than doubles as a share of output by
2030; including feedbacks, this share rises three-fold.  A large part of this
looming fiscal problem is the expected rise in future payments for Social
Security and Medicare.  Dealing with this long-term fiscal imbalance will12
likely be one of the most significant challenges facing policymakers during
the next century.
II. The Conventional View of Debt
In this section we present what we believe to be the conventional view
of the effects of government debt on the economy.  We begin with a qualitative
description of those effects, focusing on the impact of debt on saving and
capital formation, and thereby on output and income, on factor prices and the
distribution of income, and on the exchange rate and foreign transactions.  We
also review some other economic and non-economic consequences of government
borrowing.
Following our qualitative analysis, we try to quantify some of the long-
run effects of debt in a very rough way.  Although quantifying these effects
precisely is an arduous task, we think it important to have some quantitative
sense of what is at stake.  Therefore, we present a ballpark estimate of the
impact of debt, which is interesting in itself and also illuminates some of
the critical assumptions underlying all quantitative analyses of government
debt.
Our analysis assumes that government spending on goods and services is
not affected by debt policy.  That is, we examine the effects of issuing a
given amount of debt and reducing taxes temporarily by an equal amount. 
Because the government must satisfy an intertemporal budget constraint, and
because debt cannot grow forever as a share of income, this temporary tax
reduction will generally be accompanied by a future tax increase.  For most of
this section, we simply assume that the present value of that tax increase
equals the current increase in debt.  We defer more careful consideration of
the budget constraint to the last part of the section, where we re-examine the
effects of debt in a world with uncertainty.  The analysis also assumes,
except where stated otherwise, that monetary policy is unaffected by debt13
policy.  By excluding possible monetization of the debt, we can couch our
discussion in real, rather than nominal, terms.
A. How Does Debt Affect the Economy?
The government's debt policy has important influence over the economy
both in the short run and in the long run.  We begin by discussing the short-
run effects of budget deficits.  We then turn to the long-run effects, of
which the most important is a reduction in national wealth.  In particular, we
explain both how deficits affect national saving and how the change in saving
affects many aspects of the economy.  We also consider several other long-run
effects of government debt.
1. The Short Run: Increased Demand for Output
Suppose that the government creates a budget deficit by holding spending
constant and reducing tax revenue.  This policy raises households' current
disposable income and, perhaps, their lifetime wealth as well.  Conventional
analysis presumes that the increases in income and wealth boost household
spending on consumption goods and, thus, the aggregate demand for goods and
services.
How does this shift in aggregate demand affect the economy?  According
to conventional analysis, the economy is Keynesian in the short run, so the
increase in aggregate demand raises national income.  That is, because of
sticky wages, sticky prices, or temporary misperceptions, shifts in aggregate
demand affect the utilization of the economy's factors of production.  This
Keynesian analysis provides a common justification for the policy of cutting
taxes or increasing government spending (and thereby running budget deficits)
when the economy is faced with a possible recession.
Conventional analysis also posits, however, that the economy is
classical in the long run.  The sticky wages, sticky prices, or temporary14
misperceptions that make aggregate demand matter in the short run are less
important in the long run.  As a result, fiscal policy affects national income
only by changing the supply of the factors of production.  The mechanism
through which this occurs is our next topic.
2. The Long Run: Reduced National Saving and Its Consequences
To understand the effect of government debt and deficits, it is crucial
to keep in mind several national accounting identities.  Let Y denote national
income, C private consumption, S private saving, and T taxes less government
transfer payments.  The private sector's budget constraint implies that:
Y = C + S + T .
National income also equals national output, which can be divided into four
types of spending:
Y = C + I + G + NX ,
where I is domestic investment, G is government purchases of goods and
services, and NX is net exports of goods and services.  Combining these
identities yields:
S + (T-G) = I + NX .
This identity states that the sum of private and public saving must equal the
sum of investment and net exports.
The next important identity is that a nation's current account balance
must equal the negative of its capital account balance.  The current account
balance is defined as net exports NX plus net investment income by domestic
residents and net transfers; for the most part, we ignore these last two,
smaller pieces.  The negative of the capital account balance is called net
foreign investment, or NFI, which is investment by domestic residents in other
countries less domestic investment undertaken by foreign residents.  Thus, the
third identity is simply:15
NX = NFI ,
so that international flows of goods and services must be matched by
international flows of funds.  Substituting this identity into the other two
identities yields:
S + (T-G) = I + NFI .
The left side of this equation shows national saving as the sum of private and
public saving, and the right side shows the uses of these saved funds for
investment at home and abroad.  This identity can be viewed as describing the
two sides in the market for loanable funds.
Now suppose that the government holds spending constant and reduces tax
revenue, thereby creating a budget deficit and decreasing public saving.  This
identity may continue to be satisfied in several complementary ways: Private
saving may rise, domestic investment may decline, and net foreign investment
may decline.  We consider each of these possibilities in turn.
To start, an increase in private saving may ensue for a number of
reasons that we discuss below.  In fact, some economists have argued that
private saving will rise exactly as much as public saving falls, and the next
section of the paper examines this case at length.  For now, we adopt the
conventional view that private saving rises by less than public saving falls,
so that national saving declines.  In this case, total investment--at home and
abroad--must decline as well.
Reduced domestic investment over a period of time will result in a
smaller domestic capital stock, which in turn implies lower output and income. 
With less capital available, the marginal product of capital will be higher,
raising the interest rate and the return earned by each unit of capital.  At
the same time, labor productivity would be lower, thereby reducing the average
real wage and total labor income.
Reduced net foreign investment over a period of time means that domestic
residents will own less capital abroad (or that foreign residents will own     5For more complete analysis of the international effects of debt, see
Frenkel and Razin (1992, chapters 7, 8, 10 and 11) and Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1996, chapter 3).
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more domestic capital).  In either case, the capital income of domestic
residents will fall.  Moreover, the decline in net foreign investment must be
matched by a decline in net exports, which constitutes an increase in the
trade deficit of goods and services.  As this connection between the budget
deficit and the trade deficit became better known in the United States during
the 1980s, it led to the popular term "twin deficits."  Pushing the trade
balance into deficit generally requires an appreciation of the currency, which
makes domestically-produced goods relatively more expensive than foreign-
produced goods.5
3. Other Effects
Although increasing aggregate demand in the short run and reducing the
capital stock in the long run are probably the most important effects of
government budget deficits, debt policy also affects the economy in various
other ways.  We describe several of these effects here.
First, government debt can affect monetary policy.  A country with a
large debt is likely to face high interest rates, and the monetary authority
may be pressured to try to reduce those rates through expansionary policy. 
This strategy may reduce interest rates in the short run, but in the long run
will leave real interest rates roughly unchanged and inflation and nominal
interest rates higher.  In the United States, at least in recent years,
monetary policy has apparently not responded to fiscal policy in this way. 
For example, the U.S. debt-income ratio rose sharply during the 1980s, and the
U.S. inflation rate declined sharply.  Nevertheless, successive Chairmen of
the Federal Reserve Board have warned of the possible link between the budget     6Paul Volcker told Congress in 1985 that "the actual and prospective size
of the budget deficit ... heightens skepticism about our ability to control
the money supply and contain inflation" (p. 10).  Alan Greenspan said in 1995
that he expected that "a substantial reduction in the long-term prospective
deficit of the United States will significantly lower very long-term inflation
expectations vis-a-vis other countries" (p. 141).
     7Woodford (1995) proposes an alternative "fiscal theory of the price
level," based on the effect of prices on the real value of government debt and
thus on aggregate demand.  Woodford considers an economy of infinitely-lived
households, and hypothesizes an increase in government debt with no offsetting
change in future taxes or spending.  This policy makes households wealthier
and increases aggregate demand.  If aggregate supply is unchanged, both goods-
market equilibrium and the government's budget constraint require that the
price level increases enough to reduce real debt to its initial value.  The
mechanism is quite similar to the Pigou-Patinkin (1965) real-balance effect,
except that it allows for households that appear to be Ricardian, and it
involves total government liabilities rather than just outside money.  In
contrast to the Sargent-Wallace analysis, Woodford's point does not depend on
any particular response by the monetary authority to changes in fiscal policy.
     8For further analysis of the connections between fiscal policy and
monetary policy, see Aiyagari and Gertler (1985), Leeper (1991), McCallum
(1984), and Sims (1994).
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deficit and inflation.6
In extreme cases, a country with a large debt may have difficulty
financing an ongoing deficit through additional borrowing and, as a result,
will be tempted to raise revenue through seigniorage.  If the fiscal authority
can force the monetary authority to finance ongoing deficits with seigniorage,
then, as Sargent and Wallace (1981) argue, inflation is ultimately a fiscal
phenomenon rather than a monetary one.7  This monetization of the debt is the
classic explanation for hyperinflation.  For example, staggering budget
deficits as a share of national income were the root cause of hyperinflations
in 1920s Germany and 1980s Bolivia.  As Sargent (1983) explains, inflation can
fall sharply in such a country when government borrowing is reduced and the
central bank commits not to finance future deficits.  Yet, this line of
reasoning is not very important for most developed countries today, as
seigniorage represents a very small share of total government revenue.8
A second effect of government debt is the deadweight loss of the taxes
needed to service that debt.  The debt-service payments themselves are not a18
cost to a society as a whole, but, leaving aside any payments to foreigners,
merely a transfer among members of the society.  Yet effecting that transfer
in a world without lump-sum taxes will create some distortion of individual
behavior that generates a deadweight loss.  Thus, a policy of reducing taxes
and running a budget deficit means smaller deadweight losses as the debt is
being accumulated but larger deadweight losses when the debt is being serviced
with higher taxes.
A third effect of government debt is to alter the political process that
determines fiscal policy.  Some economists have argued that the possibility of
government borrowing reduces the discipline of the budget process.  When
additional government spending does not need to be matched by additional tax
revenue, policymakers and the public will generally worry less about whether
the additional spending is appropriate.  This argument dates back at least to
Wicksell (1896), and has been echoed over the years by Musgrave (1959),
Buchanan and Wagner (1977), and Feldstein (1995) among others.  Wicksell
claimed that if the benefit of some type of government spending exceeded its
cost, it should be possible to finance that spending in a way that would
receive unanimous support from the voters; he concluded that the government
should only undertake a course of spending and taxes that did receive nearly
unanimous approval.  In the case of deficit finance, Wicksell was concerned
that "the interests [of future taxpayers] are not represented at all or are
represented inadequately in the tax-approving assembly" (p. 106).  Musgrave
noted that when budget balance is altered for stabilization purposes, "the
function of taxes as an index of opportunity cost [of government spending] is
impaired" (p. 522).  Buchanan and Wagner asserted that a balanced-budget rule
"will have the effect of bringing the real costs of public outlays to the
awareness of decision makers; it will tend to dispel the illusory 'something
for nothing' aspects of fiscal choice" (p. 178).  And Feldstein wrote that
"only the 'hard budget constraint' of having to balance the budget" can force19
politicians to judge whether spending's "benefits really justify its costs"
(p. 405).
It is also possible that the existence of government debt reduces the
fiscal flexibility of the government.  If moderate levels of debt have only
small negative effects, but larger debts are perceived to be quite costly,
then a country with a moderate debt will be constrained from responding to
calls for greater spending or lower taxes.  This constraint on future
policymakers is, in fact, one of the explanations sometimes given for why
governments choose to accumulate large debts.
A fourth way in which government debt could affect the economy is by
making it more vulnerable to a crisis of international confidence.  The
Economist (4/1/95) noted that international investors have worried about high
debt levels "since King Edward III of England defaulted on his debt to Italian
bankers in 1335" (p. 59).  During the early 1980s, the large U.S. budget
deficit induced a significant inflow of foreign capital and greatly increased
the value of the dollar.  Marris (1985) argued that foreign investors would
soon lose confidence in dollar-denominated assets, and the ensuing capital
flight would sharply depreciate the dollar and produce severe macroeconomic
problems in the United States.  As Krugman (1991) described, the dollar did
indeed fall sharply in value in the late 1980s, but the predicted "hard
landing" for the U.S. economy did not result.  Krugman emphasized, however,
that currency crises of this sort have occurred in countries with higher debt-
output ratios, particularly when much of that debt is held by foreigners, as
in many Latin American countries in the 1980s.
A fifth effect of government debt is the danger of diminished political
independence or international leadership.  As with the danger of a hard
landing, this problem is more likely to arise when government borrowing is
large relative to private saving and when the country experiences a large
capital inflow from abroad.  Friedman (1988) asserted: "World power and20
influence have historically accrued to creditor countries.  It is not
coincidental that America emerged as a world power simultaneously with our
transition from a debtor nation ... to a creditor supplying investment capital
to the rest of the world" (p. 13).
B. How Large is the Long-Run Effect of Debt on the Economy?
So far we have described the effects of government debt in qualitative
terms.  We now present rough quantitative estimates of some of these effects. 
We begin with an extremely simple calculation of the effect on national income
of a reduced capital stock, and we then explore the sensitivity of our results
to three key assumptions.  Our ballpark estimate is, in fact, broadly
consistent with the few other quantitative analyses in the literature.  We
also note the magnitude of the deadweight loss caused by the taxes needed to
finance the debt service.  We calibrate our calculations for the U.S. economy,
but the approach is applicable to other countries as well.
1. The Parable of the Debt Fairy
As we have discussed, a primary effect of government debt is the
crowding out of capital and the consequences that result from this crowding
out.  How large are these effects?  To answer this question, consider the
parable offered by Ball and Mankiw (1995).  Imagine that one night a debt
fairy (a cousin of the celebrated tooth fairy) were to travel around the
economy and replaced every government bond with a piece of capital of
equivalent value.  How different would the economy be the next morning when
everyone woke up?
It is straightforward to calculate the effect of this addition to the
capital stock.  If factors of production earn their marginal product, then the
marginal product of capital equals the capital share of income (MPK*K/Y)
divided by the capital-output ratio (K/Y).  In the United States between 1960     9These data are drawn from the National Income and Product Accounts of
the Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  Net capital
income is the sum of corporate profits, rental income, net interest, and a
share of proprietors' income (all with appropriate adjustments for inventory
valuation and capital consumption).  Gross capital income equals net income
plus depreciation.  We use national income plus depreciation as the measure of
total output and income.  The capital stock is BEA's net stock of fixed
reproducible tangible wealth excluding consumer durables.  Including the value
of inventories and land in the measure of capital would depress the estimated
return on capital.  On the other hand, Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba
(1983) note that "pre-tax" corporate profits in the national income accounts
actually represent profits after the payment of state and local property
taxes; adding these taxes back into profits would raise the estimated rates of
return.  Finally, some authors measure the benefit of additional saving by the
return to nonfinancial corporate capital.  Because corporate capital is more
heavily taxed than other capital, it earns a higher pre-tax return.  Yet,
there is no reason to assume that any addition to the capital stock would flow
disproportionately to corporations.
      10The actual effect of adding this much capital would be somewhat
smaller, because the marginal product would decline as the capital stock
increased.
21
and 1994, the gross return to capital was roughly one-third of income, and the
capital-output ratio averaged a little over three.9 The implied marginal
product of capital is about 9.5 percent.  More precisely, this figure
represents the gross marginal product; it shows how much an extra dollar of
capital adds to gross output and income.  If the country wants to maintain
that dollar of capital, however, then it needs to do replacement investment to
offset depreciation.  Depreciation amounts to roughly 3.5 percent of capital,
so the net marginal product of capital is about 6 percent.  In other words,
each dollar of capital raises gross national product by 9.5 cents and net
national product by 6 cents.
When the debt fairy magically reverses the effects of crowding out, the
amount of capital increases by the amount of federal government debt, which in
the United States is about one-half of gross output.  Our estimates of the
marginal product of capital imply that gross output would be increased by
about 4.75 percent, and net output by about 3 percent.10  In 1997, these
increases amount to about $400 billion and $250 billion, respectively.
The story of the debt fairy is appealing because it offers a simple way22
to calculate the effects of government debt on national income.  But is this
calculation realistic?  The debt-fairy calculation implicitly makes three
assumptions: 
(1) Deficits do not affect private saving, so debt crowds out other
forms of private wealth one for one.  
(2) The economy is closed, so crowding out takes the form of a reduced
capital stock. 
(3) The profit rate measures the marginal product of capital, so it can
be used to gauge the effects of a change in the capital stock.  
Let us consider how relaxing each of these assumptions might alter the
conclusion that current U.S. government debt reduces U.S. national income by
about 3 percent.
2. A Closer Look at the Effect of Debt on Private Savings
The debt fairy replaces each dollar of government debt with one dollar
of capital.  Is this dollar-for-dollar substitution appropriate?  More
concretely, if the U.S. government had run sufficient surpluses during the
past twenty years to reduce its debt to zero, would national wealth now be
larger by the amount of the actual current debt?
In actuality, an increased flow of government borrowing will affect the
flow of private saving through several channels.  First, private saving will
rise because some households will save part of the tax reduction to consume
later in life.  Second, forward-looking consumers will realize that the
increasing debt will force higher future interest payments by the government
and, thus, higher future taxes.  Third, greater government borrowing will
affect interest rates and wages, and these general-equilibrium effects in turn
will affect private saving.  Fourth, the government's debt policy may affect
distortionary capital taxes, which in turn affect private saving.  For all of
these reasons, the size of the budget deficit affects the amount of private23
saving.
Understanding the long-run effect of debt on capital therefore requires
a formal, general equilibrium model, with particular attention paid to
household saving behavior.  Conventional analysis focuses on models with
overlapping generations of life-cycle consumers introduced by Samuelson (1958)
and Diamond (1965).  Because this model incorporates people at different
stages of their life-cycle who differ in both their level of wealth and
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, aggregation is often difficult
in realistic models with more than two generations.  Blanchard (1985) resolves
this problem by making assumptions about the aging process that simplify
aggregation analytically.  Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and other researchers
resolve this problem by simulating a more complicated model numerically.  
Before turning to the results from these well-known analyses, however,
it is instructive to examine a simple, stylized example.  Consider an economy
in which every person lives for a fixed number of periods.  Assume that the
interest rate is given (either because this is a small open economy or because
the technology is linear in capital and labor).  Also assume that the
consumers choose the same level of consumption in each period of life (either
because their rate of time preference happens to equal the interest rate or
because they have Leontief preferences).  Now consider how an increase in
government debt affects the steady state.  Higher debt means higher interest
payments and higher taxes.  If those taxes are distributed equally across
people of different ages, then each person's after-tax income is reduced by
the amount of those interest payments (per capita) in each period.  Because
consumers still want to smooth consumption, they respond to this higher tax
burden by reducing consumption in each period by the same amount.  As a
result, after-tax income and consumption fall equally, private saving is
unchanged, and private wealth is unchanged.   Each dollar of debt crowds out
exactly one dollar of capital, as assumed by the debt fairy parable.     11Let p be the probability of dying in each period or, as suggested by
Blanchard and Summers (1984), a "myopia coefficient" that reflects mortality
or myopia.  Let r equal the world interest rate and 2 the rate of time
preference.  Then Blanchard reports 
that dW/dD = -p(p+r)-1(p+2)(p+2-r)-1.  
     12Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 131) report that, in the steady state,
dK/dD = -p(p+2)/[(p+r)(p+2-r)-F"C], where K is the capital stock, C is
consumption, and F is the aggregate net production function.
     13For attempts to use variants of the Blanchard model to estimate the
cost of various debt policies, see Romer (1988) and Evans (1991).
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To see what happens when various assumptions are relaxed, we turn to the
Blanchard and Auerbach-Kotlikoff analyses.  Blanchard develops a continuous-
time overlapping-generations model in which people have log utility and face a
fixed probability of dying in each period.  He examines the effect of
accumulating additional government debt and then holding debt at its new level
forever.  To establish notation, let D denote debt and W denote national
wealth (domestic capital plus net foreign assets), so private wealth equals
D+W.  For a small open economy, Blanchard confirms the result from our simple
example: Steady-state dW/dD equals -1 if the rate of time preference equals
the world interest rate.  If the world interest rate and the rate of time
preference differ, crowding out may be larger or smaller than one for one.11
Matters become more complicated in a closed economy.  In this case, as
capital is crowded out, the interest rate rises, and households are encouraged
to save.  As a result, the absolute value of dW/dD is smaller in a closed
economy than in an open economy.12  Calculations using the Blanchard model
indicate that the difference between open and closed economies is substantial,
but this result appears highly sensitive to the assumption of log utility,
according to which households are very willing to substitute consumption
between periods in response to a higher interest rate.  Most research in the
consumption literature suggests a much smaller intertemporal elasticity of
substitution than unity.1325
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) construct a large-scale general
equilibrium model, and simulate the model to examine the effects of
alternative debt, tax, and Social Security policies.  The numerical
simulations reveal not only the steady-state changes in capital and other
variables, but also the transition path to the new steady state.  The model
assumes that people have an economic lifetime of 55 years, have perfect
foresight about future economic conditions, and make rational choices
regarding their consumption and labor supply.  The government raises funds
through distortionary taxes and satisfies an intertemporal budget constraint. 
A production function for net output completes the model, which describes a
closed economy.  Auerbach and Kotlikoff choose values for the key parameters
based on the empirical literature.  Note, in particular, that they assume that
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 0.25.
Auerbach and Kotlikoff examine the effect of reducing taxes and
accumulating debt over a certain number of years, and then boosting taxes to
hold the debt at its new per-capita level forever.  This debt policy reduces
saving and capital by transferring resources from younger and future
generations, who have a low or zero marginal propensity to consume, to older
generations, who have a high marginal propensity to consume.  Capital is also
diminished by the higher rate of distortionary income taxes in the long run,
although the initial reduction in the tax rate can actually crowd-in capital
in the short run.  Auerbach and Kotlikoff analyze deficits equal to 5 percent
of output that last for one year, 5 years, and 20 years; they do not report
the resulting levels of debt, but these can be calculated approximately based
on the size of the deficits and the interest rate.  For all three experiments,
the decline in capital appears to be extremely close to the increase in     14The increases in debt from the three alternative policies are roughly
5, 30, and 200 percent of output.  The corresponding declines in the capital
stock are 5, 29, and 182 percent of output.
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debt.14
We conclude this discussion by emphasizing that the short-run effect of
a budget deficit on consumption and saving is a poor guide to the long-run
effect of debt on national wealth.  In a model with life-cycle consumers,
government debt may have only a small short-run effect, as confirmed by
Blanchard (who finds that initial saving adjusts by only several percent of a
change in debt) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (who find that at the end of a 20-
year tax cut, the capital stock is reduced by only one-fifth of its eventual
decline).  Nonetheless, debt has a much larger effect on life-cycle consumers
in the long run.  Auerbach and Kotlikoff's closed-economy model shows
approximately one-for-one crowding out; Blanchard's formulas suggest smaller
effects in a closed economy but roughly one-for-one crowding out in an open
economy.  On balance, the debt fairy's one-for-one substitution of capital for
debt may be on the high side of the truth, but it seems a reasonable
approximation.
3. A Closer Look at International Capital Flows
When the debt fairy changes government debt into national wealth, the
increment to national wealth is assumed to take the form of domestic capital,
with no change in net ownership of foreign assets.  This is clearly not a
realistic description of an open economy.  Yet, alternative assumptions about
international capital flows would have little effect on the estimated impact
of government debt.
In actuality, net international capital flows are fairly small. 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) examined five-year averages of domestic
investment and saving across countries and found these two variables moved     15See Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991) and Dornbusch (1991).
     16Frankel (1991), Mussa and Goldstein (1993), and Gordon and Bovenberg
(1996) review the evidence regarding international capital mobility and
discuss a number of explanations for the observed immobility.  For a recent
attempt to explain the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle within the context of
neoclassical growth theory, see Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
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almost exactly one for one with each other.  More recent estimates suggest
that the strength of this relationship declined somewhat in the 1980s. 
Nonetheless, these estimates indicate about 75 percent of a long-term change
in national saving adds to domestic investment and only 25 percent goes to
investment abroad.15 
Because many countries allow capital to move freely across their
borders, it is surprising that net international capital flows are not larger
in the long run.  The literature has considered many possible explanations.16 
For our purposes, though, the key point is that the existence of international
capital flows--or the lack of such flows--has little impact on the ultimate
cost of government debt.  Suppose that the debt fairy transformed each dollar
of reduced debt into an extra dollar of net foreign assets, rather than an
extra dollar of domestic capital.  In this case, which is the extreme opposite
of our original assumption, the debt reduction would not raise domestic output
at all.  Instead, it would raise foreign output, and some of that output would
flow back to this country as the return on our additional overseas assets.  As
long as the return to wealth are the same at home and abroad, the location of
the extra wealth does not affect our income.
Another way to understand this point is to note the distinction between
domestic income and national income.  Domestic income is the value of
production occurring within a nation's borders; this is identically equal to
domestic output or GDP.  Tomorrow's domestic output and income depend on
today's domestic investment.  But the consumption of domestic residents
depends on their income, which is the value of production accruing to a     17Because some owners of domestic capital are foreigners, this shift
actually raises national income slightly.
28
nation's residents.  This is called national income, and it is identically
equal to national output or GNP.  Tomorrow's national output and income depend
on today's national saving, wherever this saving is ultimately invested.
Naturally, this strong statement requires several caveats.  First, the
statement ignores the tax implications of the location of capital. 
Governments receive a higher effective tax rate on capital located in their
countries than on capital owned by their residents but located abroad.  Thus,
the social return to domestic investment is higher than the social return to
foreign investment, even if the private (after-tax) returns are the same.
Second, additional capital accumulation does not reduce the marginal
product of capital as quickly if the capital can flow abroad.  As we saw in
our earlier discussion of the Blanchard model, the effect of debt on the
capital stock is reduced if changes in the capital stock affect the interest
rate and thereby private saving.
Third, the location of nationally-owned capital does affect the
distribution of income.  If the domestic capital stock increases, so does the
wage, while the return to capital and the interest rate fall; domestic workers
benefit and owners of domestic capital are hurt.17  An increase in the
ownership of capital located abroad does not have these effects.
Fourth, international capital flows change the composition of domestic
production.  If a smaller deficit raises net foreign investment, then net
exports will rise, while if it increases only domestic investment, then of
course investment spending will rise.  Moreover, the budget deficit affects
the exchange rate if there are significant international capital flows, but
not otherwise.
On balance, it seems that the issuance of government debt has only a
small effect on international capital flows in the long run and that those29
flows have only a small effect on the return to extra saving.  Acknowledging
the openness of the economy, therefore, does not substantially alter the
estimated impact of government debt.
4. A Closer Look at the Marginal Product of Capital
In describing the impact of the debt fairy, we calculated the marginal
product of capital using the capital share of national income and the capital-
output ratio.  This calculation was based on the standard premise that the
factors of production, including capital, are paid their marginal product. 
Now we reconsider whether that calculation was appropriate.
In recent years, there has been a wave of research that proposes a new
view of capital.  As Mankiw (1995) discusses, a variety of empirical problems
with the basic neoclassical growth model would be resolved if the true capital
share in the production function is much larger than the one-third measured
from the national income accounts.  One reason that the true capital share
might be larger than the raw data suggest is that capital may have significant
externalities, as argued by Romer (1986, 1987).  If the social marginal
product of capital is well above the private marginal product that we observe,
then reducing government debt and raising the capital stock would have much
larger effects than the debt fairy parable suggests.
Another possible reason for a large capital share is that the correct
measure of capital includes human capital, such as education and training, as
well as tangible physical capital, like plant and equipment.  Mankiw, Romer
and Weil (1992) propose an extension of the basic Solow (1956) model in which
there are fixed saving rates for both physical capital and human capital. 
They show that cross-country data are consistent with this model and an
aggregate production function of the form Y = K1/3H1/3L1/3.  If the share of
income devoted to human-capital accumulation is unchanged by debt policy, then
the reduction in income caused by the crowding-out of physical capital will     18Auerbach and Kotlikoff's (1987) estimates of the welfare effects of
debt policy include this cost, but isolating its significance from their
published results is not possible.
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also reduce the stock of human capital; in this case, government debt reduces
income substantially more than our earlier calculation indicated.  By
contrast, if the stock of human capital remained fixed, then our earlier
calculation would be correct.
5. The Deadweight Loss of Servicing the Debt
When discussing the qualitative effects of debt, we reviewed a number of
issues beyond the impact of debt on the capital stock.  The only one of those
effects that is readily quantifiable is the deadweight loss of the additional
taxes needed to meet the debt service burden.18  Of course, the deadweight
loss of taxation was reduced during the period when taxes were lower and the
debt was accumulated, and optimal debt policy requires balancing these
effects.  Our concern here, however, is just with the cost of an ongoing debt.
If the government builds up a certain debt, and then decides to hold
that debt constant in real terms, the additional debt service per dollar of
accumulated debt is r, the real interest rate on debt.  If 8 is the deadweight
loss per dollar of tax revenue, then the loss per dollar of debt is 8r.  The
total real return on intermediate-maturity government debt averaged about 2
percent between 1926 and 1994 (Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation, 1995).  A
standard choice for 8 is Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley's (1985) estimate of
one-third, although Feldstein (1996b) argues that incorporating distortions to
the form of compensation and the demand for deductions--in addition to the
usual distortions to labor and capital supply--makes the true 8 much larger. 
If 8 equals one-half, then 8r is .01, and with the U.S. debt-income ratio at
one-half, the deadweight loss from servicing the debt is about half a percent
of output.31
6. Summary
As concern about current and prospective U.S. budget deficits has grown,
quantitative estimates of the effect of debt have begun to appear in official
U.S. government documents.  For example, the 1994 Economic Report of the
President (pp. 85-87) assumed that the President's deficit-reduction plan
would boost national saving by 1 percent of output each year for 50 years. 
Then the Report used a simple Solow growth model to show the effect of that
extra saving on the economy.  It concluded that the additional saving would
eventually raise output by 3.75 percent.  More recently, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO, 1997b) constructed a complex model of the economy and the
federal budget and simulated the model through the year 2050.  Because current
law would produce an explosive rise in the national debt over that period,
CBO's results do not reflect steady-state effects.  In the simulation that
includes the economic effects of increasing debt, debt rises by 30 percent of
output by 2020, resulting in output that is 2 percent smaller than it
otherwise would be.  Over the following decade, debt increases by another 80
percent of output, and output is diminished by more than 8 percent relative to
the same baseline.  Thus, these calculations are similar in spirit to those
found in the academic literature. 
We have now quantified, in a very rough way, some long-run effects of
government debt on the economy.  The debt fairy parable implied that each
dollar of debt reduces net output by about six cents each year.  More careful
consideration of the strong assumptions embodied in that parable suggested
that this estimated cost is at least in the right ballpark.  The deadweight
loss from the taxes needed to service the debt adds about another one cent per
dollar of debt.  Thus, the U.S. debt of the late 1990s, which equals about
half of annual output, is reducing net output by about 3.5 percent.  In 1997,
this amounts to around $300 billion per year.
Is this cost large?  Labor productivity has increased by about one32
percent per year in the United States since 1975, so reducing output by three
to four percent is like giving up three to four years of productivity growth. 
That is a significant loss, but it does not qualify as a disaster.  One final
comparison of the cost of the current debt is to the effect of the upcoming
demographic transition in the United States.  CBO (1997b) projects that, under
current law, population aging and rising health care costs will boost non-
interest spending of the federal government by five percent of output between
1996 and 2025.  If the current debt were maintained in real terms, it would
represent about one-third of real output in 2025 (because of economic growth). 
Thus, eliminating that debt would add about two percent to national income, or
almost half of the extra income needed to cover the additional government
spending.
III. Ricardian Equivalence
So far our discussion has focussed on the conventional analysis of
government debt.  By "conventional," we mean that this analysis describes the
views held by most economists and almost all policymakers.  There is, however,
another view of government debt that has been influential in the academic
debate, even if endorsed by only a minority of economists.  That view is
called Ricardian equivalence after the great 19th century economist David
Ricardo, who first noted the theoretical argument.  In recent years, the
Ricardian view has been closely associated with Robert Barro, whose work has
given the view renewed vigor and prominence.
A. The Idea and Its History
Ricardian equivalence is a type of neutrality proposition: It states
that a certain type of government policy does not have any important effects. 
In this section we discuss the general idea, its history, and its importance33
as a theoretical benchmark.  In the following sections we examine the various
dimensions of the debate over the validity of Ricardian equivalence as a
description of the real world.
1. The Essence of the Ricardian Argument
Suppose that the government cuts taxes today without any plans to reduce
government purchases today or in the future.  As we have seen, conventional
analysis concludes that this policy will stimulate consumption, reduce
national saving and capital accumulation, and thereby depress long-term
economic growth.  By contrast, the theory of Ricardian equivalence asserts
that this policy will not alter consumption, capital accumulation, or growth. 
The situation with the tax cut and budget deficit is equivalent to the
situation without it.
The Ricardian argument is based on the insight that lower taxes and a
budget deficit today require (in the absence of any change in government
purchases) higher taxes in the future.  Thus, the issuing of government debt
to finance a tax cut represents not a reduction in the tax burden but merely a
postponement of it.  If consumers are sufficiently forward looking, they will
look ahead to the future taxes implied by government debt.  Understanding that
their total tax burden is unchanged, they will not respond to the tax cut by
increasing consumption.  Instead, they will save the entire tax cut to meet
the upcoming tax liability; as a result, the decrease in public saving (the
budget deficit) will coincide with an increase in private saving of precisely
the same size.  National saving will stay the same, as will all other
macroeconomic variables.
In essence, the Ricardian argument combines two fundamental ideas: the
government budget constraint and the permanent income hypothesis.  The
government budget constraint says that lower taxes today imply higher taxes in
the future if government purchases are unchanged; the present value of the tax34
burden is invariant to the path of the tax burden.  The permanent income
hypothesis says that households base their consumption decisions on permanent
income, which depends on the present value of after-tax earnings.  Because a
debt-financed tax cut alters the path of the tax burden but not its present
value, it does not alter permanent income or consumption.  Thus, all of the
predictions of the conventional analysis of government debt no longer hold.
Another way to view the Ricardian argument is suggested by the title of
Robert Barro's classic 1974 paper "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?"  To the
owners of government bonds, the bond represents an asset.  But to taxpayers,
government bonds represents a liability.  A debt-financed tax cut is like a
gift of government bonds to those getting the tax cut.  This gift makes the
holder of the bond wealthier, but it makes taxpayers poorer.  On net, no
wealth has been created.  Because households in total are no richer than they
were, they should not alter their consumption in response to the tax cut.
It is important to emphasize that the Ricardian argument does not render
all fiscal policy irrelevant.  If the government cuts taxes today and
households expect this tax cut to be met with future cuts in government
purchases, then households' permanent income does rise, which stimulates
consumption and reduces national saving.  But note that it is the expected cut
in government purchases, rather than the tax cut, that stimulates consumption. 
The reduction in expected future government purchases would alter permanent
income and consumption because they imply lower taxes at some time, even if
current taxes are unchanged.
Because the Ricardian view renders some fiscal policies irrelevant but
allows other fiscal policies to matter, providing a convincing test of this
view has proven difficult.  For example, in the early 1980s, a debt-financed
tax cut advocated by President Reagan in his first administration was followed
by a substantial rise in government debt and a fall in national saving.  Some
observers, such as Benjamin Friedman (1992), see this episode as a natural35
experiment that decisively rejects Ricardian equivalence.  Yet it is possible
that consumers expected this tax cut to mean smaller government in the future;
smaller government was, in fact, President Reagan's intention, and to some
extent it has been the result.  Moreover, other developments, such as a
booming stock market, occurred at the same time and surely had some effect on
household decisions.  In this case, higher consumption and lower national
saving could coincide with a tax cut without contradicting Ricardian
equivalence.  Because neither interpretation of history can be ruled out, both
the conventional and Ricardian views of government debt continue to have
adherents within the economics profession.
2. A Brief History of the Ricardian Idea
The modern literature on Ricardian equivalence began with Robert Barro's
1974 paper.  Not only did this paper clearly set out the Ricardian argument
but it also anticipated much of the subsequent literature by discussing many
of the reasons why Ricardian equivalence might not hold.  What the paper did
not do, however, was credit Ricardo with the idea.  It was not until James
Buchanan's 1976 comment on Barro's paper that the term Ricardian equivalence
was coined.
Ricardo was interested in the question of how a war might be funded.  In
an 1820 article, he considered an example of a war that cost 20 million
pounds.  He noted that if the interest rate were 5 percent, this expense could
be financed with a one-time tax of 20 million pounds, a perpetual tax of 1
million pounds, or a tax of 1.2 million pounds for 45 years.  He wrote,
"In point of economy, there is no real difference in either of the
modes; for twenty millions in one payment, one million per annum for
ever, or 1,200,0000 pounds for 45 years, are precisely of the same
value..."
Ricardo also was aware that the question raises the issue of intergenerational     19Quoted in Buchholz (1989, p. 73).  Ricardo's opposition to the corn
laws (which restricted the import of grain from abroad) suggests that he took
his theory of comparative advantage more seriously than he did his theory of
debt neutrality.
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linkages (which we discuss more fully in a later section):
"It would be difficult to convince a man possessed of 20,000 pounds, or
any other sum, that a perpetual payment of 50 pounds per annum was
equally burdensome with a single tax of 1000 pounds.  He would have some
vague notion that the 50 pounds per annum would be paid by posterity,
and would not be paid by him; but if he leaves his fortune to his son,
and leaves it charged with this perpetual tax, where is the difference
whether he leaves him 20,000 pounds with the tax, or 19,000 pounds
without it?"
Although Ricardo viewed these different methods of government finance as
equivalent, he doubted whether other people in fact had in the foresight to
act in so rational a manner:
"The people who pay taxes...do not manage their private affairs
accordingly.  We are apt to think that the war is burdensome only in
proportion to what we are at the moment called to pay for it in taxes,
without reflecting on the probable duration of such taxes."
And, indeed, Ricardo did not dismiss government debt as an insignificant
policy concern.  Before the British parliament, he once declared,
"This would be the happiest country in the world, and its progress in
prosperity would go beyond the powers of imagination to conceive, if we
got rid of two great evils--the national debt and the corn laws."19
Because Ricardo doubted the practical validity of Ricardian equivalence,
O'Driscoll (1977) suggested the term Ricardian nonequivalence, although this
phrase has never caught on.  Whether or not Ricardo was a Ricardian, he now
gets credit for first noting the possible irrelevance of government debt.
More recently, several sources have suggested the possibility of debt37
neutrality, as Barro in fact noted in his 1974 paper.  In 1952, Tobin posed
the Ricardian question:
"How is it possible that society merely by the device of incurring a
debt to itself can deceive itself into believing that it is wealthier? 
Do not the additional taxes which are necessary to carry the interest
charges reduce the value of other components of private wealth?"
Tobin viewed this Ricardian logic as raising an intriguing theoretical
question, but he never suggested that it might actually hold in practice.
The Ricardian argument also appears in Patinkin's (1965, p. 289) classic
treatise, Money, Interest, and Prices, which was based on a 1947 dissertation
at the University of Chicago.  In considering whether government bonds should
be treated as part of household wealth, Patinkin wrote,
"The difficulty with this approach is that the interest burden on these
bonds must presumably be financed by future taxes.  Hence if the private
sector discounts its future tax liabilities in the same way that it
discounts future interest receipts, the existence of government bonds
will not generate any net wealth effect."
Patinkin does not claim originality for this idea.  In a footnote, he says,
"This point is due to Carl Christ, who cites in turn discussions with Milton
Friedman."
In 1962, Martin Bailey's textbook explained clearly (p. 75) the
possibility "that households regard deficit financing as equivalent to taxes." 
Bailey explains:
"[Government debt] implies future taxes that would not be necessary if
the expenditures were financed with current taxation.  If a typical
household were to save the entire amount that was made available to it
by a switch from current taxation to deficit financing, the interest on
the saving would meet the future tax charges to pay interest on the
government bonds, while the principal saved would be available to meet38
possible future taxes imposed to repay the principal on the government
bonds. If the household has a definite idea of how it wants to allocate
its total present and future resources among consumption at different
points of time, and if it recognizes that the shift from current
taxation to deficit financing does not change its total resources at all
from a long-run point of view, then it will indeed put entirely into
saving any 'income' made available to it by a government decision to
finance by bond issue rather than current taxation.  That is, the
household will consume exactly the same amount, whichever form of
financing is used."
Bailey even points out in a footnote that "the same argument applies if no
repayment [of the debt's principal] is expected, if the typical household
plans to leave an estate."  Bailey does not cite Ricardo, but in the text's
preface he refers to this section and notes, "a claim to original authorship
must be shared with at least two other persons, Gary Becker and Reuben Kessel,
who independently developed the same material for their respective courses."
The idea of Ricardian equivalence, therefore, has had a long and
distinguished history.  Yet there is no doubt that Robert Barro's 1974 paper
was a turning point in the literature on government debt.  Barro stated the
conditions for Ricardian equivalence more clearly than the previous literature
had, and he laid out explicitly the intergenerational model needed to
establish the result.  (We discuss this model below.)  Perhaps the greater
thoroughness in Barro's treatment of the issue is founded in his apparent
belief in debt neutrality.  Previous authors, including Ricardo, raised the
theoretical possibility of neutrality but often doubted its practical
applicability.
In a way, Barro can be viewed as the Christopher Columbus of Ricardian
equivalence.  Columbus was not the first European to discover America, for
Leif Ericsson and others had come before.  Instead, Columbus's great39
confidence in the importance of his mission ensured that he was the last
European to discover America: After Columbus, America stayed discovered. 
Similarly, Robert Barro was not the first economist to discover Ricardian
equivalence, but he was surely the last.  Since Barro's work, Ricardian
equivalence has maintained its place at the center of the debate over
government debt, and no one will be able to discover it again.
3. Why Ricardian Equivalence is So Important
Although most economists today agree with David Ricardo and doubt that
Ricardian equivalence describes actual consumer behavior, the idea of
Ricardian equivalence has been extraordinarily important within the academic
debate over government debt.  There are two reasons for this.  
The first reason is that a small but prominent minority of economists,
including Robert Barro, have argued that Ricardian equivalence does in fact
describe the world, at least as a first approximation.  This small group has
provided a useful reminder to the rest of the profession that the conventional
view of government debt is far from a scientific certitude.  The inability of
macroeconomists to perform true experiments makes macroeconomic knowledge open
to debate.  Although we believe that policymakers are best advised to rely on
the conventional view of government debt, we admit that there is room for
reasonable disagreement.
The second and more significant reason that Ricardian equivalence is
important is that it offers a theoretical benchmark for much further analysis. 
There are many parallels both inside and outside of economics.  Mathematicians
study Euclidean geometry (even though we now know that we live in a non-
Euclidean world); physicists study frictionless planes (even though all real
planes exhibit some friction); and economists study Arrow-Debreu general-
equilibrium models with complete and perfectly competitive markets (even
though markets in actual economies are neither complete nor perfectly40
competitive).
The theoretical benchmark in economics that is most similar to Ricardian
equivalence is the Modigliani-Miller theorem.  Modigliani and Miller
established conditions under which a firm's choice between debt and equity
finance is irrelevant.  Similarly, Ricardian equivalence is the claim that the
government's choice between debt and tax finance is irrelevant.  Few finance
economists believe that the Modigliani-Miller theorem describes actual firms'
financing decisions.  Nonetheless, the theorem provides a starting point for
many discussions in corporate finance.  Similarly, even if Ricardian
equivalence does not describe the world, it can be viewed as one natural
starting point in the theoretical analysis of government debt.  As the next
section should make clear, trying to explain why Ricardian equivalence is not
true can yield a deeper understanding about the effects of government debt on
the economy.
B. The Debate over Ricardian Equivalence: Theoretical Issues
Although most economists today are skeptical of the Ricardian
proposition that government debt is irrelevant, there is less consensus about
why government debt matters.  The conventional view (which we discussed
earlier) begins with the premise that a debt-financed tax cut stimulates
consumption.  There are various reasons why this might be the case.
1. Intergenerational Redistribution
One reason government debt might matter is that it represents a
redistribution of resources across different generations of taxpayers.  When
the government cuts taxes and issues government debt today, the government
budget constraint requires a tax increase in the future, but that tax increase
might fall on taxpayers who are not yet living.  This redistribution of
resources from future to current taxpayers enriches those who are now living;41
current taxpayers respond to the increase in their resources by consuming
more.  This intergenerational redistribution is the mechanism that makes
government debt matter in basic overlapping-generations models, such as those
of Diamond (1965) and Blanchard (1985).
Barro's 1974 paper built on Becker's (1974) theory of the family to
provide a clever rejoinder to this argument.  Barro argued that because future
generations are the children and grandchildren of the current generation, it
is a mistake to view them as independent economic actors.  Instead, Barro
suggested that current generations might behave altruistically toward future
generations.  In the presence of this intergenerational altruism, it is no
longer natural to presume that current generations will take advantage of the
opportunity to consume at the expense of future generations.
Barro proposed the following model of the family.  Suppose that the
total utility of generation t, denoted Vt, depends on consumption during its
lifetime Ct and on the utility of its children Vt+1, discounted by some factor
$:
Vt = U(Ct) + $Vt+1.
Recursive substitution establishes that
Vt = U(Ct) + $U(Ct+1) + $2U(Ct+2)+ $3U(Ct+3) + ...
That is, the utility of generation t depends on its own consumption and the
consumption of all future generations.  In essence, the relevant
decisionmaking unit is not the individual, who lives only a finite number of
years, but the family, which continues forever. As a result, the family member
alive today decides how much to consume based not only on his own income but
also on the income of future members of his family.  Ricardian equivalence is,
therefore, preserved: A debt-financed tax cut may raise the income an
individual receives in his lifetime, but it does not raise his family's
permanent income. Instead of consuming the extra income from the tax cut, the
individual saves it and leaves it as a bequest to his descendants, who will     20For other discussions of the role of intergenerational transfers in
wealth accumulation, see Gale and Scholz (1994), Kessler and Masson (1989),
Kotlikoff (1988), and Modigliani (1988).
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bear the future tax liability.
The debate over Ricardian equivalence is, therefore, in part a debate
over how different generations are linked to one another.  This issue has
broad significance for macroeconomics.  As Kotlikoff and Summers (1981)
established, a large fraction of wealth in the U.S. economy is eventually
bequeathed rather than consumed by its current owner.20  It is possible that
many bequests are accidental rather than intentional; that is, people might
leave bequests because they die unexpectedly before consuming their entire
wealth.  Yet the fact that annuity markets (even if imperfect) are used so
rarely suggests that consumers must have some desire to leave bequests.
The altruism model proposed by Barro is one possible model of the
bequest motive, but there are others.  Another popular model is the "joy of
giving" or "warm glow" model, according to which a person's utility depends on
the size of his bequest rather than on the utility of his children.  That is,
Vt = U(Ct) + G(Bt),
where G(Bt) represents the utility from giving a bequest of size Bt.  Closely
related to this model is the "strategic bequest motive" proposed by Bernheim,
Shleifer, and Summers (1985); according to this model, parents use bequests to
induce certain types of behavior from the children, such as visiting home more
frequently.  These alternative models of the bequest motive do not give
individuals any reason to look ahead to their children's tax liabilities and,
therefore, do not yield Ricardian equivalence in the presence of policy-
induced intergenerational redistributions.
It is sometimes mistakenly claimed that the effects of government debt
depend on whether people have finite lives (as is the case in the Diamond
overlapping-generations model) or infinite lives (as is effectively the case43
in the Barro intergenerational-altruism model).  The key issue, however, is
not the finiteness of life but the introduction over time of new taxpayers
without links to the past. (This point was established by Philippe Weil,
1989.)  To see this, imagine an economy in which consumers die (according to
some Poisson process) but no new consumers are ever born.  In this economy,
all future tax liabilities must fall on people who are currently living, so
Ricardian equivalence would hold, despite the finiteness of life.  By
contrast, consider an economy in which new consumers are born over time but,
once born, live forever.  In this economy, some of the future tax liabilities
implied by government debt would fall on future arrivals, and Ricardian
equivalence would fail to hold. 
The Barro model of intergenerational altruism, which links all future
arrivals to those currently living, has attracted a variety of theoretical
criticisms.  One of the more entertaining is that offered by Bernheim and
Bagwell (1988), who build on the well established tenet that human
reproduction is sexual and that, as a result, people share common descendants. 
Indeed, if one looks back and forth among everyone's future family trees, one
quickly concludes that the entire world population is connected through a web
of familial relationships.  This observation, together with intergenerational
altruism, yields profound predictions.  According to the Barro model, a
transfer of a dollar (in present value) between Doug Elmendorf and one of his
descendants does not affect anyone's consumption.  Similarly, a transfer
between Greg Mankiw and one of his descendants does not affect anyone's
consumption.  But if Elmendorf and Mankiw have common descendants, as surely
they must, then a transfer between Elmendorf and Mankiw does not affect
anyone's consumption.  Indeed, because everyone is connected through common
descendants, the entire distribution of income is irrelevant--a prediction
that is surely false.  Bernheim and Bagwell use this argument as a reductio ad
absurdum to conclude that the Barro model cannot describe the relationships44
among generations.
A less intriguing, but ultimately more persuasive, critique of the Barro
model of intergenerational altruism arises from the work of Evans (1991),
Daniel (1993), and Smetters (1996).  Suppose that we consider a standard model
of intergenerational altruism but add the seemingly innocuous wrinkle that the
degree of altruism (as measured above by the parameter $) differs across
families.  Even if all consumers have some degree of altruism, it is likely in
the presence of heterogeneity that many consumers will not have operative
bequest motives.  In the steady state of such a model, the interest rate is
determined by the time preference of the most patient family (that is, the
family with the highest $).  At this interest rate, other families will choose
to hit the corner solution of zero bequests and, therefore, will act like a
series of overlapping generations: They will save for life-cycle reasons but
will leave no bequests.  For these zero-bequest families, transfers of
resources across generations will have real effects.
Despite the failure of Ricardian equivalence in this model, the level of
government debt does not matter for aggregate variables in the economy's
steady state.  Because the time preference of the most patient family pins
down the steady-state interest rate, it also pins down the capital stock and
the level of output.  A debt-financed tax cut, for instance, will stimulate
consumption, crowd out capital, and raise the real interest rate for a period
of time, but the most patient family will respond by increasing saving until,
eventually, the capital stock and real interest rate return to their former
levels.  This result suggests that Ricardian equivalence may work better as a
long-run theory than as a short-run theory.
Finally, it is worth noting that, for some purposes, the importance of
these intergenerational issues may be overstated.  Poterba and Summers (1987)
claim that, even without intergenerational altruism, people may have long
enough time horizons to make Ricardian equivalence approximately true in the     21Even if private saving does rise approximately one-for-one with the
budget deficit in the short run, there could be substantial crowding out of
capital in the long run.  The Auerbach-Kotlikoff simulations discussed earlier
suggest that the full effects of government debt take a long time to appear in
life-cycle models.  Thus, the Poterba-Summers argument raises the possibility-
-in contrast to the model with heterogeneous altruism just discussed--that
Ricardian equivalence may work well as a short-run theory but not as a long-
run theory.
45
short run for some policy interventions.  For example, imagine that the
government cuts taxes today, issues government debt with an interest rate of 5
percent, and then services the interest payments with higher taxes over the
infinite future.  In this case, about 77 percent of the future taxes occur
within 30 years, indicating that the redistribution of the tax burden toward
future generations, though not zero, is relatively small.  Moreover, because
the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth for life-cycle consumers is
relatively small, the redistribution that does occur has only a small effect
on consumption.  Thus, the immediate result may be an increase in private
saving approximately equal to the budget deficit. Poterba and Summers argue
that if Ricardian equivalence fails in a substantial way in the short run, the
explanation must lie not in the intergenerational redistribution caused by
government debt but in some other mechanism.21
2. Capital Market Imperfections
The simplest, and perhaps most compelling, explanation for the failure
of Ricardian equivalence is the existence of capital market imperfections. 
For households that discount future utility highly or that expect rapidly
rising income, the optimal consumption path may require consuming more than
their income when young (and less when old) by borrowing in financial markets. 
The possibility of default and bankruptcy, however, may prevent these
households from borrowing for the purposes of current consumption.  In this
case, the optimal strategy is to consume all of current income and hold
exactly zero assets.  46
In the presence of such a binding borrowing constraint, Ricardian
equivalence will no longer hold.  A debt-financed tax cut effectively gives
the constrained household the loan that it wanted but could not obtain from
private lenders.  The household will respond by increasing consumption, even
with the knowledge that the result is higher taxes and lower consumption in
the future.
The potential importance of capital market imperfections is highlighted
by the small amount of wealth that many people hold compared to the level of
government debt in our economy.  In recent years, the federal government debt
has been about half of national income.  If Ricardian equivalence held, the
typical household should be holding additional wealth equal to half of annual
income.  Yet many households have wealth far below that level.  To reconcile
Ricardian equivalence with these facts, one would need to believe that in the
absence of government debt, most households in the economy would have
substantially negative net wealth.  This seems implausible: Few consumers are
able to obtain substantial loans without tangible collateral.  Thus, it seems
that government debt has allowed many households to consume more than they
otherwise would.
The literature contains some debate over whether capital market
imperfections should cause a failure of Ricardian equivalence.  Hayashi (1987)
and Yotsuzuka (1987) present examples of endogenous capital market
imperfections based on asymmetric information that preserve Ricardian
equivalence.  In these models, asymmetric information about future income,
together with the possibility of default, prevents households from borrowing
against future income.  Yet because taxes are assumed to be lump sum, there is
no information problem about the stream of tax payments; as a result, the
borrowing constraint does not affect the ability of households to trade off
taxes today and taxes in the future.  In this case, a debt-financed tax cut
causes the borrowing constraint to adjust in such a way as to leave47
consumption opportunities unchanged.  As Bernheim (1987) points out, however,
this result is crucially dependent on the assumption that taxes are lump sum. 
If taxes rise with income, then the asymmetry in information about future
income causes a similar asymmetry in information about future tax liabilities. 
In this more realistic case, these models yield the more conventional result
that a debt-financed tax cut relaxes the borrowing constraint, allowing
households to consume more.
3. Permanent Postponement of the Tax Burden
When a person first hears the case for Ricardian equivalence, a natural
response is, "Yes, that theory might apply if a budget deficit today required
higher taxation in the future.  But, in fact, the government never has to pay
off its debts.  When the government cuts taxes and runs a budget deficit, it
can postpone the tax burden indefinitely."  This simple argument, it turns
out, raises a number of complex questions for economic theory.
The first point to make is that Ricardian equivalence does not require
that the government ever pay off its debts in the sense of reaching zero
indebtedness.  Imagine that the government cuts taxes for one year by dD,
increases the government debt by that amount, and then leaves government debt
at the new higher level forever.  To service this additional government debt
would require additional taxes of r*dD every year, where r is the interest
rate on the debt.  The present discounted value of these higher taxes is dD,
which exactly offsets the value of the tax cut.  Hence, if consumers look
ahead to all future taxes, Ricardian equivalence holds, even though the
government never retires the additional debt it has issued. 
Matters become more complicated if the government does not raise taxes
to finance the interest on this additional debt but, instead, finances these
interest payments by issuing even more debt.  This policy is sometimes called
a "Ponzi scheme" because it resembles investment scams in which old investors     22See, for instance, Ball, Elmendorf, and Mankiw (1995), Blanchard and
Weil (1992), Bohn (1993), and O'Connell and Zeldes (1988).
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are paid off with money from new investors.  If the government pursues such a
Ponzi scheme, the government debt will grow at rate r, and the initial tax cut
and budget deficit do not imply higher taxes in the future.
But can the government actually get away with this Ponzi scheme?   The
literature has explored this question extensively.22  An important issue is
the comparison between the interest rate on government debt r and the growth
rate of the economy g.  If r is greater than g, then government debt will
increase faster than the economy, and the Ponzi scheme will eventually be
rendered infeasible: The debt will grow so large that the government will be
unable to find buyers for all of it, forcing either default or a tax increase. 
By contrast, if r is less than g, then government debt will increase more
slowly than the economy, and there is nothing to prevent the government from
rolling over the debt forever.
The comparison between r and g has broader general-equilibrium
implications, however, and these implications help explain the effects of
government debt.  In standard neoclassical growth theory, r reflects the
marginal product of capital, and g reflects population growth and
technological change.  These two variables can be used to gauge whether the
economy has reached a dynamically efficient equilibrium.  If r is greater than
g, then the economy is efficient in the sense of having less capital than at
the "Golden Rule" steady state.  By contrast, if r is less than g, then the
economy in inefficient in the sense of having accumulated too much capital. 
In this case, a reduction in capital accumulation can potentially increase
consumption in all periods of time.  A government Ponzi scheme, like the
"asset bubbles" studied by Tirole (1985), is both feasible and desirable in
such an economy because it helps ameliorate the problem of oversaving.     23Ball, Elmendorf and Mankiw (1995) build on these ideas and consider
policies in dynamically efficient economies called "Ponzi gambles" in which
the government cuts taxes and rolls over the resulting debt for as long as is
possible.  In their model, debt can raise the welfare of all generations in
those realizations of history in which taxes do not need to be increased.  Yet
the policy is a gamble because the government is sometimes forced to raise
taxes.  Moreover, those tax increases are especially undesirable because they
occur in realizations of history in which future generations are already
burdened by low economic growth.
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Dynamic inefficiency and successful, Pareto-improving Ponzi schemes
offer an intriguing theoretical possibility, but they are not of great
practical relevance for the U.S. economy or other economies around the world. 
Economists today do not believe that households are saving too much, driving
the return to capital below the economy's growth rate.  And, indeed, Abel,
Mankiw, Summers and Zeckhauser (1989) present evidence for dynamic efficiency. 
Hence, Ricardian equivalence cannot be refuted by asserting that the
government can roll over the debt forever.
Yet one nagging fact remains: In the U.S. economy, the interest rate on
government debt has on average been less than the growth rate of the economy. 
Abel et al. reconcile this fact with their finding of dynamic efficiency by
noting that government debt and economic growth have different risk
characteristics.  They present an example of a dynamically efficient economy
in which uncertainty about economic growth drives down the return on risk-free
assets, such as government debt, below the average growth rate.  Thus, one
cannot judge dynamic efficiency (and the feasibility of government Ponzi
schemes) simply by comparing the average return on risk-free assets with the
average growth rate.23
4. Distortionary Taxes
The Ricardian equivalence proposition is based on the assumption that
taxes are lump sum.  If instead taxes are distortionary, then a postponement
of the tax burden affects incentives and thereby behavior.  These50
microeconomic distortions could have a large macroeconomic impact, making
Ricardian equivalence a poor approximation to reality.
To see the potential importance of distortionary taxation, imagine an
economy described by the standard Ramsey growth model except that taxes,
rather than being lump-sum, are raised with a proportional income tax with
rate J.  The following equations describe the steady state:
y = f(k)
Jy = rD + g
r = f'(k)
(1-J)r = D
The first equation is the production function.  The second equation states
that tax revenue Jy equals the interest on the debt rD plus government
spending g.  The third equation states that the interest rate r equals the
marginal product of capital.  (Both interest income and capital income are
assumed to be taxed at the same rate, so the tax does not affect this
equation.)  The fourth equation states that the after-tax interest rate equals
the rate of subjective time preference D; this is the steady-state condition
for the Ramsey model.  Given these equations, it is straightforward to see how
an increase in government debt affects the economy.  Higher debt leads to
higher debt service; a higher debt service requires a higher tax rate; a
higher tax rate leads to a higher before-tax interest rate; and a higher
interest rate leads to a smaller steady-state capital stock.  As in the
traditional analysis, government debt crowds out capital, even though the
mechanism here is quite different.
We can easily calibrate the magnitude of this effect for this model.  By
fully differentiating this system we obtain an expression to show how much
debt crowds out capital:
dk/dD = {J - (Df"/f') + [(1-J)ff"/(f')2]}-1.     24The numerical results presented here are, of course, sensitive to a
variety of detailed assumptions.  If we introduce depreciation, so that the
production function is f(k) = k" - *k, then the degree of crowding as measured
by dk/dD falls.  If we take a broad view of capital, so that " is larger than
1/3, then the degree of crowding rises. 
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If we specialize the production function to Cobb-Douglas y=k", then this
expression becomes:
dk/dD = {J + [(1-")(D/k)] - [(1-J)(1-")/"]}-1.
For the U.S. economy, taxes take about one-third of income (J=1/3), capital
earns about one third of income ("=1/3), and the debt equals about one-seventh
of the capital stock (D/k=1/7).  For these parameter values, dk/dD=-1.11. 
That is, an extra dollar of government debt reduces the steady-state capital
stock by slightly over one dollar.  This example shows that substantial
crowding out can occur simply because of distortionary taxation.24
Although this example is sufficient to show the potential importance of
distortionary taxation, more realistic analyses of debt policy go beyond this
special case.  In the steady state of the Ramsey model, national saving is
infinitely elastic at the rate of time preference.  Other models, such as the
life-cycle model of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), would predict a more
limited saving response to a change in the after-tax rate of return.  In
addition, it is important to consider the dynamic effects of tax changes, as
in Judd (1987) and Dotsey (1994), and the effects of taxes on labor supply, as
in Trostel (1993) and Ludvigson (1996).  Perhaps the only certain conclusion
is that in a world with distortionary taxation, Ricardian equivalence is
unlikely to provide a good first approximation to the true effects of debt
policy.
5. Income Uncertainty
Another possible reason for the failure of Ricardian equivalence is that
government debt may alter consumers' perception of the risks they face.  This52
possibility was explored by Chan (1983), Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes (1986),
Kimball and Mankiw (1989), and Croushore (1996).  These authors begin with the
axioms that taxes are levied as a function of income and that future income is
uncertain.  Therefore, when the government cuts taxes today, issues government
debt, and raises income taxes in the future to pay off the debt, consumers'
expected lifetime income is unchanged, but the uncertainty they face is
reduced.  If consumers have a precautionary saving motive, this reduction in
uncertainty stimulates current consumption.  Put differently, consumers
discount risky uncertain income and uncertain future taxes at a higher rate
than the interest rate on government bonds; a postponement of the tax burden,
therefore, encourages current spending.
The potential importance of this mechanism is highlighted by the recent
interest in buffer-stock theories of saving.  (See, for instance, Carroll,
1997.)  In these models, consumers are impatient (in the sense of having a
high subjective discount rate) but are nonetheless prudent (in the sense of
having a precautionary saving motive).  As a result, consumers maintain a
small amount of saving in order to protect themselves against unlikely but
very adverse shocks to their income.  If consumers do not pay significant
taxes when these unlikely, adverse outcomes are realized, then a postponement
of the tax burden will stimulate current consumption.
6. Myopia
When non-economists are explained the idea of Ricardian equivalence,
they often have trouble taking the idea seriously.  The reason for this
response goes to the heart of how economists view human behavior.  Rational,
optimizing, forward-looking homo economicus is a creature of the economist's
imagination.  Economists are trained in the power of this model, but non-
economists are often more skeptical.  In particular, non-economists are
doubtful about whether people have the foresight to look ahead to the future53
taxes implied by government debt, as is required for Ricardian equivalence to
hold.
It is hard to incorporate this sort of myopia into economic theory.  Yet
there have been some attempts to model short-sightedness.  Strotz (1956) and
Laibson (1997), for instance, consider preferences according to which
consumers give excessive weight to current utility (compared to the benchmark
case of exponential discounting).  As a result, consumers exhibit time-
inconsistent behavior and can be made better off through a binding commitment
to increased saving.  This model can explain the popular notion that people
save too little, but it cannot by itself explain a failure of Ricardian
equivalence.  In this model, the time-inconsistent consumer faces a standard
intertemporal budget constraint, so a postponement of the tax burden does not
alter the consumer's opportunities.  This consumer saves too little but,
without a binding borrowing constraint or other imperfection, is fully
Ricardian in response to fiscal policy.
Although the Ricardian behavior of Strotz-Laibson consumers shows that
myopia by itself need not undermine Ricardian equivalence, this result does
not necessarily render myopia irrelevant in this debate.  The impatience
implicit in the Strotz-Laibson preferences can explain the prevalence of
liquidity constraints and buffer-stock saving, which in turn highlights the
deviations from Ricardian equivalence emphasized earlier.  In addition, it is
possible that the Strotz-Laibson approach to modelling myopia is not the best
one.  Developing better models of myopic behavior remains a challenge for
future research.
C. The Debate over Ricardian Equivalence: Empirical Issues
The theoretical literature just discussed offers various reasons why
government debt may affect consumption and capital accumulation.  Yet these
deviations from Ricardian equivalence do not prove that the proposition is a     25Our review of this literature is necessarily brief.  For more thorough
discussions with additional citations, see Bernheim (1987) and Seater (1993). 
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bad first approximation of the actual economy.  To reach such a judgment, one
must assess the quantitative importance of these theoretical deviations from
the Ricardian benchmark.
Some of the research discussed earlier bears on this issue.  As noted
above, calculations using the Blanchard model of finite lifetimes imply that
debt can crowd out a significant amount of capital, and Auerbach and
Kotlikoff's simulations show that the combination of finite lifetimes and
distortionary taxes can generate roughly one-for-one crowding out.  Moreover,
many of the theoretical analyses cited in the previous section include
calibrations that illustrate the potential importance of the channels through
which debt may affect the economy.
Simulations, however, are no substitute for evidence.  In this section
we review the empirical evidence on the validity of Ricardian equivalence.  We
begin with tests of the assumptions underlying the proposition and conclude
that a substantial fraction of households probably do not behave as the
proposition assumes.  We next turn to tests of the proposition's implications
for various macroeconomic variables.  Despite substantial research in this
area, we believe that the results are ultimately inconclusive.25
1. Testing Assumptions About Household Behavior
When testing theories, economists typically focus on the theories'
implications rather than their assumptions.  Yet, because testing the
implications of Ricardian equivalence raises substantial difficulties,
examining the underlying assumptions is also worthwhile.  The key assumption
is consumption smoothing both within lifetimes and across generations.  That
is, households are assumed to choose consumption and saving based on a
rational evaluation of an intertemporal budget constraint that includes both55
current and future generations.
One piece of evidence that many households do not behave in this way is
the small amount of wealth that they hold.  This situation may arise from a
combination of impatience and borrowing constraints, as described earlier, or
because some people are not very forward-looking.  In either case, a deficit-
financed tax cut would spur consumption.
Numerous papers also present evidence that people do not smooth
consumption fully over time.  Campbell and Mankiw (1989) use aggregate data to
show that consumption is more sensitive to current income than the basic
consumption-smoothing model predicts.  Hall and Mishkin (1982), Zeldes (1989),
and Carroll and Summers (1991) make the same point using household data. 
Further confirmation comes from households' responses to changes in taxes and
government benefits; for example, see Poterba (1988), Wilcox (1989), and
Shapiro and Slemrod (1995).  In these studies, deviations from the lifecycle
model are economically as well as statistically significant.  Some studies,
such as Runkle (1991), Attanasio and Browning (1995), and Attanasio and Weber
(1995), have argued that income and consumption data are in fact consistent
with the consumption-smoothing model.  But the weight of the evidence from the
consumption literature is that consumption smoothing is far from complete.  In
our view, this conclusion casts serious doubt on the empirical plausibility of
Ricardian equivalence.
2. Testing the Implications for Consumption
A large and contentious literature has focused on the implication of
Ricardian equivalence that a reduction in current taxes with no change in
current or future government spending should not affect household consumption. 
The standard approach is to estimate a traditional aggregate consumption
function, with consumer spending as the dependent variable and income, wealth,
fiscal policy, and various other controls as independent variables.  Ricardian     26For a discussion of the identification problem in the context of tests
of Ricardian equivalence, see Cardia (1997).
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equivalence is rejected if the coefficients on taxes and debt are
significantly different from zero.
Although this approach seems to offer a direct test of the Ricardian
view, there are a number of problems with its implementation.  The first
problem is the treatment of expectations.  The behavior of forward-looking
households depends on expectations of fiscal policy, not just the measures of
current fiscal policy that are included in these regressions.  Suppose that
the current level of taxation reflects expectations of future government
spending.  (This is in fact implied by the theory of tax-smoothing, which we
discuss later.)  In this case, a significant negative coefficient on current
taxes in the consumption function does not necessarily violate Ricardian
equivalence.
A second problem is simultaneity.  Some of this literature estimates the
consumption function with ordinary least squares.  This approach is valid only
if the shocks to the consumption function do not affect fiscal policy or other
right-hand side variables.   Other papers attempt to address this problem
using instrumental variables, but finding persuasive instruments is close to
impossible.26
A third problem in this literature is that the number of observations is
small compared with the number of highly correlated explanatory variables.  In
addition to the basic fiscal variables, some authors include measures of the
marginal tax rate, while others separate taxes and spending by the level of
government.  Still others decompose the income and fiscal variables into
permanent and transitory components as a way of capturing expectations. 
Although there may be good reasons to include these variables as a matter of
theory, their addition compounds the problem of multicollinearity.  One way to
increase the independent variation in the explanatory variables is to use a57
longer estimation period, but this procedure can introduce spans in which
consumption is clearly distorted, such as during wars.
A final problem is that these specifications may have little power to
distinguish between the Ricardian and conventional views of fiscal policy.  As
discussed earlier, lifecycle consumers' marginal propensity to consume out of
a temporary tax cut may be only a few cents on the dollar.  This value may be
statistically indistinguishable from the Ricardian benchmark of zero effect. 
Nonetheless, the difference between a small and a zero marginal propensity to
consume is economically important, for a small short-run drop in saving can
cumulate to a large long-run decline in the capital stock.
Various recent papers have tried to avoid some of these problems by
building on the Euler equation approach pioneered by Hall (1978).  By looking
at the first-order condition for a representative consumer, rather than an
aggregate consumption function, some of the problems in measuring expectations
are avoided.  Yet the problem of power remains.  The first-order condition for
a finite-horizon consumer in the Blanchard model is not very different from
the first-order condition for an infinite-horizon consumer.  Nonetheless,
policy can have substantially different effects in the two cases, especially
in the long run. 
With these problems in mind, it is perhaps not surprising that this
literature has failed to reach a consensus on the validity of Ricardian
equivalence.  Some researchers have concluded that equivalence is a reasonable
description of the world; for example, see Kormendi (1983), Aschauer (1985),
Seater and Mariano (1985), Evans (1988), and Kormendi and Meguire (1986, 1990,
1995).  Other researchers have reached the opposite conclusion; for example,
see Feldstein (1982), Modigliani and Sterling (1986, 1990), Feldstein and
Elmendorf (1990), Evans (1993), and Graham and Himarios (1991, 1996).
Our view is that this literature considered as a whole is simply
inconclusive.  Many studies that fail to reject Ricardian equivalence are also     27For example, see Evans (1988), Kormendi and Meguire (1990), and Seater
and Mariano (1985).  The latter paper present an extreme example of lack of
power: the authors cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on taxes
equals zero, but neither can they reject that it equals minus one.
     28For example, see Seater and Mariano (1985).
     29For example, some of the strongest evidence in favor of Ricardian
equivalence comes from the especially thorough investigation conducted by
Kormendi (1983) and Kormendi and Meguire (1986, 1990, 1995).  Yet, Kormendi
and Meguire (1990) show that although their results are robust to a variety of
changes in specification (table 1), they are not robust to the seemingly
innocuous choice of deflator (table 2).  For further discussion of Kormendi
and Meguire's specification, see the exchanges between them and Barth, Iden,
and Russek (1986), Modigliani and Sterling (1986, 1990), and Graham (1995). 
As another example of the sensitivity of results, Graham and Himarios (1991,
1996) show that the estimates of Aschauer (1985) and Evans (1988) are not
robust to alternative formulations of the Euler equation or measures of
consumption.
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unable to reject the lifecycle model, as their standard errors are large
relative to the difference in coefficient values implied by the alternative
hypotheses.27  Further, some studies that find insignificant effects of taxes
on consumption also find insignificant effects of government spending, which
is inconsistent with both Ricardian and lifecycle models and suggests that
this framework does not reflect the true effects of fiscal policy.28  More
generally, most results in this literature appear very sensitive to small
differences in specification.29
3. Testing the Implications for Interest Rates
Ricardian equivalence implies that a debt-financed reduction in
government revenue should not affect interest rates.  The conventional view of
debt generally implies the opposite.  An important set of papers tests this
implication by examining the effect of the budget deficit on interest rates
after controlling for government spending and other influences.  
As with the literature concerning the consumption effects of fiscal
policy, research into interest-rate effects appears straightforward, but
numerous problems quickly arise.  Indeed, some of the problems in the two59
literatures are quite similar.
One problem is that interest rates depend on expectations of fiscal
policy and other variables and those expectations are hard to measure.  A
number of studies use forecasts from vector autoregressions as a proxy for
expectations, but the quality of those proxies is unclear.  Vector
autoregressions assume that variables follow a stable time-series process, and
they do not incorporate non-quantitative information.  Both of these points
are likely to be important, especially for fiscal policy variables, which are
the outcome of a political process.  Measurement error in the proxies for
expectations biases the estimated coefficients toward zero and, thus, toward
the null hypothesis of Ricardian equivalence.
A second problem with this approach as a test of Ricardian equivalence
is that there is no natural metric for gauging the size of interest-rate
effects.  For the effect of taxes on consumption, there are natural Keynesian
and lifecycle benchmarks as well as the Ricardian benchmark.  Indeed, this
feature was critical in assessing whether tests of Ricardian equivalence had
any power against alternative descriptions of the world.  But no such
alternative benchmarks exist for interest rates, because the size of the
movements expected under non-Ricardian views depends on a host of
elasticities.  In particular, if international capital flows have an important
effect on the domestic financial market, interest rates may not respond much
to fiscal policy even if Ricardian equivalence is invalid.
With these caveats in mind, it is worth noting that this literature has
typically supported the Ricardian view that budget deficits have no effect on
interest rates.  Plosser (1982) pioneered the approach of measuring expected
policy using vector autoregressions.  Further work in this vein by Plosser
(1987), Evans (1987a, 1987b), and Boothe and Reid (1989) has confirmed
Plosser's original conclusion that a zero effect of deficits cannot be     30Different sorts of analyses by Evans (1985), Hoelscher (1986), and
Wachtel and Young (1987) have reached mixed conclusions.
     31For example, Plosser (1987, table 10) reports sharply different
coefficient estimates during the 1968-76 and 1977-85 sample periods and using
monthly data as opposed to quarterly data.  As another example, Evans (1987a,
tables 1 and 2) estimates that budget deficits had a small and statistically
insignificant effect on nominal interest rates during the 1950s, 1960s and
1970s, but an effect that was large, statistically significant, and
surprisingly negative between 1979 and 1984.  Of course, the effect of budget
deficits may well have changed over time, but an estimated shift of this
magnitude signals some problem with specification.
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rejected.30
Our view is that this literature, like the literature regarding the
effect of fiscal policy on consumption, is ultimately not very informative. 
Examined carefully, the results are simply too hard to swallow, for three
reasons.  First, the estimated effects of policy variables are often not
robust to changes in sample period or specification.31  Second, the measures
of expectations included in the regressions generally explain only a small
part of the total variation in interest rates.  For example, the average R-
squared of Plosser's basic monthly regressions (1987, tables 6 and 7) is .06,
and the corresponding value of Evans's basic quarterly regressions (1987b,
table 1) is .09.  This poor fit suggests some combination of measurement error
in expectations and the omission of other relevant (and possibly correlated)
variables.  Under either explanation, the estimated coefficients on the policy
variables must be viewed with skepticism.  Third, Plosser (1987) and Evans
(1987b) generally cannot reject the hypothesis that government spending,
budget deficits, and monetary policy each have no effect on interest rates. 
Plosser (1987) also reports that expected inflation has no significant effect
on nominal interest rates.  These findings suggest that this framework has
little power to measure the true effects of policy.
4. Testing the Implications for International Variables
Ricardian equivalence implies that a debt-financed reduction in     32For example, fewer than half of the estimated coefficients reported by
Evans (1986, tables 1 and 7) are statistically distinguishable from zero.
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government revenue should not affect the exchange rate or the current account. 
In contrast, the conventional view of debt implies that the exchange rate
should appreciate in these circumstances and the trade deficit should
increase.  Several researchers have tested these implications and reached
conflicting conclusions.
Evans (1986) applies to exchange rates the methodology used by Plosser
and Evans to study the effect of budget deficits on interest rates.  He
concludes that U.S. budget deficits tend to cause a depreciation of the
dollar, in contrast to both the Ricardian and conventional views.  Evans's
analysis is subject to the same problems that plague the interest-rate
literature discussed above.32  Moreover, a decline in the dollar should cause
a strengthening of the trade balance.  Yet Bernheim (1988) and Rosensweig and
Tallman (1993) conclude that U.S. trade deficits worsen when the U.S. budget
deficit increases.
In the end, the empirical literature examining the effects of fiscal
policy on consumption, interest rates, and international variables fails to
offer clear evidence either for or against the Ricardian hypothesis.  If the
evidence is so weak, why then do most economists feel confident in rejecting
Ricardian equivalence as a description of the world?  The answer, we believe,
is that most economists are incredulous about the assumptions that are needed
to support the Ricardian view of government debt.  In this case, the debate
over theory is more persuasive than the debate over evidence.
IV.  Optimal Debt Policy
Disagreement about the appropriate amount of government debt in the
United States is as old as the country itself.  Alexander Hamilton (1781)
believed that "a national debt, if it is not excessive, will be to us a62
national blessing," while James Madison (1790) argued that "a public debt is a
public curse."  Indeed, the location of the nation's capital was chosen as
part of a deal in which the federal government assumed the Revolutionary War
debts of the states: Because the Northern states had larger outstanding debts,
the capital was located in the South.  Attention to the national debt has
waxed and waned over the years, but has been intense during the past two
decades.  Similarly, government debt and deficits have been a focus of recent
public debate in many European countries.
The appropriate use of government debt depends on how debt affects the
economy.  As we have seen in the theoretical debate over Ricardian
equivalence, debt could potentially have many different effects.  As a result,
the literature on optimal debt policy is broad in scope.  Here we focus on the
three effects that are most often viewed as important: the use of debt policy
to reduce the magnitude of economic fluctuations, the use of debt policy to
increase national saving, and the use of debt policy to reduce tax distortions
by smoothing taxes over time. 
A. Fiscal Policy over the Business Cycle
Although some economists argue that fluctuations in aggregate output
represent an optimal response to shifts in preferences or technology, most
economists believe that some output variability arises from rigidities or
coordination failures.  These changes in output, and especially shortfalls of
output relative to the potential determined by the available factors of
production, are socially costly.  In this case, timely adjustments to the
government deficit and debt may raise social welfare.  This notion of
"countercyclical fiscal policy" dates at least to Keynes, and Blinder and
Solow (1973) present one of the classic analyses.
Countercyclical fiscal policy arises automatically from the design of
tax and transfer programs.  When output and income are high, tax liabilities63
rise and eligibility for government benefits falls, reducing the budget
deficit; when output and income are low, these effects reverse and the deficit
widens.  These "automatic stabilizers" are important quantitatively.  CBO
(1997a) estimates that when real output falls by 1 percent, tax revenue
declines by about 1 percent.
Countercyclical fiscal policy may also be implemented on a discretionary
basis.  For example, during the 1975 recession, Gerald Ford and Congress
agreed to a small cut in personal income taxes.  Over time, however, this sort
of policy has fallen into disfavor.  During the 1990 recession, for instance,
taxpayers received a reduction in tax withholding but not their tax liability. 
Part of this shift in views comes from a realization that an explicitly
temporary change in taxes has only a small effect on the consumption of
forward-looking consumers.  Moreover, there are generally long lags in
enacting discretionary changes in fiscal policy, so any effect on aggregate
demand may be poorly timed.  Finally, and perhaps most important, there is an
increased appreciation for the ability of the Federal Reserve to conduct
effective countercyclical monetary policy.
B. Fiscal Policy and National Saving
The most important long-run effect of government debt under the
conventional view is to reduce national wealth.  Thus, optimal debt policy in
the long run depends primarily on optimal national saving.  Current public
debate often takes as given the notion that saving should be increased. 
Proving this point, however, is by no means straightforward.  Bernheim (1994),
Lazear (1994) and Hubbard and Skinner (1996) provide recent discussions of why
more saving might be desirable.  Examining this topic in detail is beyond the
scope of this paper, but we consider briefly the issues that relate to
government debt.  We consider first whether debt policy should be used to make
people save more for their own retirement, and then whether debt policy should64
be used to make current generations leave more wealth to future ones.
1. Life-Cycle Saving
Feldstein (1985) argues that people should do more saving within their
lifetimes because the marginal product of capital exceeds their marginal rate
of substitution between present and future consumption.  This wedge arises, he
argues, because of the taxation of capital income.  He is surely right that
capital taxation distorts households' consumption decisions.  But does this
imply that debt policy should be used to increase national saving?  The answer
is not obvious.
Suppose that people are life-cycle consumers whose consumption is
distorted by capital taxation.  Eliminating the distortion would be desirable,
but this goal cannot be achieved simply through debt policy.  For instance, if
the government raises lump-sum taxation today, reduces government debt, and
thereby reduces lump-sum taxation later within these consumers' lifetimes,
Ricardian equivalence obtains, and national saving does not change.  By
contrast, Ricardian equivalence fails to hold if the future tax reductions
benefit future generations.  In this case, national saving rises because the
income effect of current taxation reduces current generations' consumption. 
Nonetheless, the distortion between current and future consumption of any
given generation is unchanged.  That is, the increase in national saving
induced by debt policy does not mitigate the distortionary effects of capital
taxation. 
When considering how policy affects national saving, it is important to
distinguish between the allocation of consumption across a person's lifetime
and the allocation of consumption across generations.  Capital taxation
inefficiently encourages consumption when a person is young compared to
consumption when the same person is old.  In a life-cycle model, however, debt
policy does not affect this comparison.  Instead, debt policy affects the     33Musgrave also argued that the budget deficit should vary over the
business cycle for stabilization purposes.
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consumption of current generations compared to the consumption of future
generations.  Thus, in a life-cycle model with rational consumers and
distortionary capital taxes, life-cycle saving is inefficiently low, but debt
policy cannot remedy the problem.
2. Intergenerational Saving
Debt policy can affect national saving by transferring resources among
generations of life-cycle consumers.  One approach to intergenerational equity
in the context of debt policy is to focus on the appropriate distribution of
paying for government services.  The "benefit principle" implies that current
spending should be financed out of current taxes, but capital spending should
be financed over the life of the capital.  Musgrave (1959) advocated this
approach, terming it "pay-as-you-use finance" (p. 558).33  This principle
provides one justification for the practice of financing wars--which are
expected to benefit future as well as current generations--largely through
debt issuance.
Another approach to intergenerational concerns about government debt is
to consider the overall welfare of different generations using an explicit
social welfare function.  As Romer (1988) notes, a utilitarian social planner
discounts income at the rate * = 2 + g/F, where 2 is the intergenerational
discount rate for utility, g is the growth rate of income, and F is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (which equals the inverse of the
elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption).  Income growth
matters here because it reduces the utility gained from an extra dollar of
income.  If the net marginal product of capital r exceeds *, then deferring
consumption to future generations is socially optimal.
Applying this criterion is by no means straightforward.  Obviously, one66
must determine how much to discount the utility of future generations.  One
might argue that zero is the most consistent with people choosing a social
welfare function "behind a veil of ignorance" (Rawls, 1971) about the
generation to which they belong.  If 2=0, g=.01, and F=.33, the social
discount rate * is 0.03.  If r=.06, which is the value we used earlier, the
net gain from deferring consumption (r-*) is .03.  One is thus led to conclude
that increased national saving would be desirable.  Yet the opposite
conclusion arises if F=.1, so that * is 0.1.  In this case, economic growth
together with sharply diminishing marginal utility ensures that the marginal
utility of future generations is low, so there is little benefit to saving on
their behalf.  In the end, therefore, the utilitarian approach to
intergenerational saving illuminates the key parameters that determine optimal
national saving, but it does not allow us to reach an easy conclusion on
whether national saving is in fact too low or too high.
C. Tax Smoothing
Another approach to analyzing optimal debt policy, advocated by Barro
(1979), emphasizes the distortionary nature of taxation.  The deadweight loss
from a tax depends roughly on the square of the tax rate.  Thus, the
distortion-minimizing way to finance a given stream of government spending is
to maintain a smooth tax rate over time.  If future government spending were
known with certainty, the optimal tax rate would be constant.  Because future
government spending is uncertain, the optimal tax rate sets the present value
of revenue equal to the present value of expected spending.  As information
about spending becomes available, the optimal tax rate changes.  Under this
view, the budget deficit is simply the difference between government spending
and the amount of revenue generated by this tax rate, and the debt will rise
and fall accordingly over time.    
Barro's tax-smoothing model is formally parallel to Friedman's67
permanent-income hypothesis.  According to the permanent-income hypothesis,
households smooth consumption by basing it on their expected permanent income;
they save and borrow in response to transitory changes in income.  According
to the tax-smoothing model, governments smooth tax rates by basing tax rates
on expected permanent government spending; they increase or decrease
government debt in response to transitory changes in spending or revenue.  
Barro (1979) finds that the tax-smoothing theory of debt explains fairly
well the behavior of U.S. debt since 1920, and Barro (1987) reaches a similar
conclusion for British debt from 1700 through World War I.  Much of the
variation in spending that Barro studies is related to wars.  Thus, the tax-
smoothing logic provides another justification (in addition to
intergenerational equity) for accumulating government debt during wars and
paying off the debt during peacetime.  
V. Conclusion
This essay has touched on some of the major issues in the debates over
the effects of government debt.  Because of the broad scope of this topic, we
have had to be selective.  We have ignored many important related subjects,
such as the management of government debt with instruments of varying
maturities, the debate over inflation-indexed debt, the pros and cons of
alternative rules for setting fiscal policy, and the theories of political
economy that attempt to explain why and when governments issue debt.  We trust
that readers who have made it to this conclusion will understand why we
avoided these additional fascinating but extensive topics.68
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Table 1
Debt and Deficits in Industrialized Countries in 1996
(percent of GDP)
Country Net Debt Budget Surplus Primary Budget
Surplus
U.S. 49 -2 1
Japan 14 -4 -4
Germany 48 -4 -1
France 39 -4 -1
Italy 112 -7 3
United Kingdom 44 -4 -1
Canada 70 -2 4
Australia 29 -1 0
Austria 51 -4 0
Belgium 127 -3 5
Denmark 46 -2 1
Finland -8 -3 -1
Greece n.a. -7 4
Iceland 37 -2 1
Ireland n.a. -1 3
Korea -22 4 4
Netherlands 48 -2 2
New Zealand n.a. 3 4
Norway -28 6 7
Portugal n.a. -4 1
Spain 53 -5 1




Note:  Data are from OECD (1997, pages A33, A35, and A38) and include all
levels of government.  "n.a." denotes not available.79
Table 2
U.S. Federal Government Explicit Assets and Liabilities
Category Estimated Value in 1995
($ billions)
Liabilities
   debt held by the public 
   (excluding the Federal Reserve)
3219
   federal pension liabilities 1513
   insurance liabilities 66
   other 498
Assets
   financial assets 576
   physical assets 1737
Net liabilities 2983








United Kingdom 27 43
Canada 19 44
United States 21 36
Note:  Data are from CBO (1997b).81
Table 4
Projected Effect of Population Aging on
Fiscal Conditions in Industrialized Countries
(percent of GDP)
Country Primary Budget Surplus Change in Debt from
2000 to 2030
1995 2030
United States 0.4 -3.8 44
Japan -3.4 -8.7 190
Germany -0.6 -6.6 45
France -1.6 -4.5 62
Italy 3.4 -5.9 109
United Kingdom -2.8 -1.4 27
Canada 1.5 -1.0 39
Australia 0.0 -1.4 37
Austria -2.7 -7.7 171
Belgium 4.3 -0.5 42
Denmark 2.0 -2.3 124
Finland -4.3 -8.8 213
Iceland -1.1 -3.3 41
Ireland 1.8 0.0 2
Netherlands 1.4 -6.0 142
Norway 3.2 -4.7 135
Portugal 0.6 -5.6 110
Spain -1.1 -4.4 66
Sweden -5.1 -2.7 117
Note:  Data are from Roseveare et al (1996) and refer only to the direct
effect of population aging without incorporating the effect of higher
interest payments on the larger outstanding debt.  The primary budget
surplus equals taxes less non-interest spending.82
Table 5
CBO Baseline Projections for the U.S. Budget
(percent of GDP)
Variable 1995 2030 2050
Without economic feedbacks
   primary deficit -1 5 6
   interest payments 3 6 12
   total deficit 2 11 18
   debt 50 125 267
With economic feedbacks
   primary deficit -1 5 n.a.
   interest payments 3 12 n.a.
   total deficit 2 17 n.a.
   debt 50 159 n.a.
Note:  Data are from CBO (1997b) and assume that discretionary spending
grows with the economy after 2007.  "n.a." signifies that the values were
too extreme to be reported by CBO.